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Abstract
Using General William Sherman’s 1864--65 military march through Georgia, South
Carolina, and North Carolina during the American Civil War, this paper studies the
effect of capital destruction on short- and long-run local economic activity, and the role
of financial markets in the recovery process. We match an 1865 US War Department
map of Sherman’s march to county-level demographic, agricultural, and manufactu-
ring data from the 1850–1920 US Censuses. We show that the capital destruction
induced by the March led to a large contraction in agricultural investment, farming as-
set prices, and manufacturing activity. Elements of the decline in agriculture persisted
through 1920. Using information on local banks and access to credit, we argue that
the underdevelopment of financial markets played a role in weakening the recovery.
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1 Introduction
Conflict and environmental disasters have caused economic mayhem throughout human his-
tory, but the understanding of their effects on growth remains limited (Skidmore and Toya
2002). In addition, scholars do not know much about which factors affect the recovery pro-
cess and, specifically, what role credit markets play in recovery. In a standard neo-classical
growth model, capital destruction should not affect long-run economic performance because
a temporary shock should be followed by rapid growth, bringing the economy back to the
original steady state. Evidence in this direction has been presented by several papers, all
examining the effects of wartime destruction in the twentieth century (Ikle 1952; Davis and
Weinstein 2002; Miguel and Roland 2011). In this paper, we study the long- and short-run
effects of capital destruction on local economies using General William Sherman’s 1864--65
military march during the American Civil War as a shock to local capital. We find that
capital destruction had large negative effects on both the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors, with some agricultural effects persisting until 1920. We also find evidence that the
underdevelopment of credit markets in the postbellum period played a role in weakening the
recovery process.
Writing to Commander Henry Halleck on Christmas Eve 1864 from freshly conquered
Savannah, Georgia, General William Sherman documented how he and his men were fighting
“not only ... armies, but a hostile people.”1 This required “mak[ing] old and young, rich and
poor, feel the hard hand of war,” particularly in a region of the South that had not hosted any
major fighting (Carr 2015, p. 134). For more than a month, Sherman marched his men 300
miles through the heart of the Confederacy to “enforce devastation” on the seceded states
of Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. His military “destroy[ed] mills, houses,
cotton-gins, & c.,” burned railroads and telegraph lines, and confiscated over 5,000 horses,
4,000 mules, 13,000 cattle, 10.5 million pounds of corn, and 9.5 million pounds of fodder.2
1Letter from Sherman to Halleck, December 24, 1864 in US War Department (1901).
2William T. Sherman, Military Division of the Mississippi Special Field Order 120, November 9, 1864 in
US War Department (1901); Lee (1995).
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They were “aveng[ing] the national wrong [Southerners had committed by] dragging [the]
country into civil war.”3
The havoc Sherman wreaked on his march—and the destruction brought by the war
generally—significantly damaged the South’s agricultural and manufacturing output relative
to the North’s. Sherman boasted in his official report on the Georgia campaign that his march
inflicted $100 million in damage to economic infrastructure in Georgia (Trudeau 2008, p.
539). In 1860, prior to the start of the war, the Confederate states produced 38 percent
of total US agricultural output and 8 percent of national manufacturing output. By 1870,
however, even after four years of postwar recovery, Southern agricultural output remained
below its prewar level in absolute terms and made up only 28 percent of the US total.
Similarly, Southern manufacturing lagged behind the rest of the nation, making up only 5
percent of national output in 1870. As one Georgia planter put it: “I had the misfortune to
be in the line of Sherman’s march, and lost everything—Devon cows, Merino sheep, Chester
hogs, Shanghai chickens, and in fact everything but my land, my wife and children and the
clothing we had at that time” (Fite 1984, p. 1).
We begin by studying the declines in economic activity caused by Sherman’s march. To
do so, we match an 1865 US War Department map of Sherman’s march to detailed county-
level demographic, agricultural, and manufacturing data from US Censuses, 1850--1920. We
compare outcomes across geographically close and economically and demographically similar
counties in the same states before and after the march: counties through which Sherman
marched and their neighbors.4 This allows us to difference out the effects of larger economic
shocks such as changes in global cotton demand and the postwar reduction in labor supply
among newly freed African Americans.5 We then explore the channels through which the
3Letter from Sherman to Halleck, December 24, 1864 in US War Department (1901).
4Throughout the paper, we refer to march and non-march counties. We define march counties as those
within 5 miles of Sherman’s march lines, that is, within a 10-mile buffer of the march lines. Non-march
counties are those outside of the 10-mile buffer, but within 100 miles of the march lines. We exclude the few
counties outside the three march states of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina that are within the
non-march zone. These counties are in Alabama, Tennessee, and Virginia.
5Wright (1986) discusses the postwar reduction in world cotton demand. Ransom and Sutch (2001)
investigate the reduction in labor supply among newly freed African Americans.
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observed short- and long-run effects operated. To perform these analyses, we make use of
demographic data, information on local infrastructure, such as railroads, and newly digitized
data on local bank and Southern credit-market conditions.
With this framework in mind, we have three main results. First, we provide the first
detailed empirical investigation of the motives behind Sherman’s campaign. We find evidence
that Sherman used the 1860 Census to prepare his route, targeting counties where supplies
were more plentiful and easier to collect. The counties through which Sherman marched had,
according to the 1860 US Census, more valuable farms and livestock, and higher outputs of
major crops like cotton, corn, and potatoes. This is consistent with the qualitative analysis
of the historical record by Trudeau (2008), Rubin (2014), and others.
Second, we show that Sherman effectively devastated these counties’ postwar economies.
In the agricultural sector, we observe a large decline in land investment and farming-asset
values. These results are significant both statistically and economically. By 1870, the value
of march-county farms was 21% lower than the value of non-march-county farms, and the
share of land improved was 15% lower.6 Some of these negative effects persisted for decades
after the end of the war. In particular, the relative share of land improved remained lower
than the antebellum level through 1920. Nor were these relative economic declines confined
to agriculture—at least in the short term. The 1860–1870 growth rates of manufacturing
output, capital, employment, and firm number were also lower in march counties than in
non-march counties. This confirms that local entrepreneurial activity and investments were
highly affected by capital destruction. Importantly, to strengthen the causal interpretation
of our results, we provide a series of robustness tests. We show that these results are not
driven by differential trends across treatment in the prewar period. We also implement an
instrumental variable estimator to tackle the potential endogeneity of Sherman’s path as
well as placebo tests using plausible alternative march routes not taken.7
6Our findings echo diaries of people along Sherman’s path. According to Rubin (2014, p. 20), one
Sandersville, Georgia resident lamented that people “struggled with deprivation, coping with the lack of
livestock and supplies” for years.
7Our baseline specification already controls for county fixed effects—which control flexibly for time-
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In our third and final result, we argue that postwar underdevelopment in credit markets
played an important role in explaining the extent of the relative effects and the delay in
recovery. Credit from the banking sector completely dried up after the Civil War: we find
that nearly every bank and every branch in Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina
shut down right after the War. This lack of credit may have interfered with the recovery
process, particularly in counties hit by Sherman. If the credit shock delayed recovery, that
may explain why we observe such persistent effects of the march decades later.
We provide three main pieces of evidence in favor of this hypothesis. First, we show that
potential alternative mechanisms—a demographic shift or the lack of infrastructure—do
not explain the large effects of the march, even in the short run. March and non-march
counties looked similar demographically before and after the War. Neither whites nor African
Americans fled march counties at faster rates than non-march counties. Infrastructure access
or investment, as measured by the number of county railroad miles in each decade from
1850–1920, was not differential across march and non-march counties either.8
Second, we find that the provision of credit made the immediate recovery more difficult
in the manufacturing sector. In particular, counties that were more dependent on credit
before the war experienced slower postwar manufacturing recovery following the march.
Since formal credit markets were deeply impaired by the war, we measure dependence by
looking at those counties where companies could have more easily accessed financing in the
prewar period. Specifically, we look at counties located closer to a bank branch or where
lending markets were particular active based on the number of firms tracked in the county by
Dun, Boyd, & Company, a credit-ratings agency (Brennecke 2016; Gonza´lez, Marshall, and
Naidu 2016). For these counties, we find much larger effects of Sherman on manufacturing
invariant county characteristics—and state-by-year fixed effects, absorbing any time-varying shocks common
to all counties within a state. We also augment this specification with a series of pre-shock controls interacted
with time dummies, which condition our parameters to heterogeneity in observables across treatment in the
prewar period.
8That is not to say that Sherman was unsuccessful in destroying railroads and telegraph lines along the
path of the march, but that his destruction was short lived. As we describe later in the paper, railroads were
mostly rebuilt by 1870 and telegraph service had been restored before the end of the war.
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activity, suggesting that credit drying up exacerbated the recovery for businesses that were
more dependent on it.9
Lastly, we also provide evidence on the importance of credit-market frictions in the
recovery of the agricultural sector. The issue here is that the antebellum banking sector
did not serve rural and agricultural needs, especially in the South (Fite 1984; Jaremski and
Rousseau 2012); instead, many small farmers relied on large local land-owners for financing
between harvests (Rajan and Ramcharan 2011; Jaremski and Fishback 2016). In principle,
these large landowners were less likely to be financially constrained because they had a larger
amount of non-land wealth and their larger-scale farming business was able to generate
more cash flow. In this setting, we document two results that are consistent with our
hypothesis that credit-market frictions had an important impact on the recovery process.
First, we find that the march led to a substantial increase in farmland concentration. In line
with the discussion in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011),10 we interpret this result as evidence
that wealthier landowners were able to take advantage of small farmers’ fire sales, in a
context where formal credit was limited or nonexistent. Importantly, this shift in land
concentration is both large in magnitude and extremely persistent. Second, we find smaller
effects of Sherman’s march in counties with a larger share of wealthy landowners. Since
large landowners are less financially constrained and they can also provide financing to other
farmers, the smaller effects in counties with more large, wealthy landowners is consistent
with credit frictions delaying recovery.
With this paper, we contribute to three related literatures. The first examines the effects
of capital and infrastructure destruction on economic local activity. Ikle (1952) studied this
in the context of the Allied bombing of German cities during World War II and found that
9While this credit mechanism does not require a direct negative effect of Sherman’s march on banks, it
would be reinforced by one. As we discuss later in the paper, we suspect that Sherman’s march did have a
negative effect on the banking sector. However, we consider this to be part of the overall treatment. We test
the credit mechanism using only potential treatment intensity, based on preexisting bank or credit access
rather than the post-treatment declines.
10For instance, Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) argue that large landowners may prefer a weaker banking
sector also because they could then take advantage of small farmers’ fire sales.
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bombed cities rebuilt fairly quickly after the war. Davis and Weinstein (2002) similarly
showed rapid postwar reconstruction of Japanese cities destroyed during WWII. More re-
cently, Miguel and Roland (2011) found that Vietnamese districts severely damaged by the
United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s also rebuilt shortly after fighting ceased.
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we show the effects of wartime capital
and infrastructure destruction in an earlier era in the United States in a largely rural and
agricultural region immediately following the end of slavery. Second, unlike the other works,
we find some effects to be persistent, particularly those on agriculture. Third, we are the
first to provide direct evidence on the importance of a developed financial market in the
recovery from large shock.11
Second, we add to the literature on the determinants of local economic growth, with
particular interest in the role of the financial sector. Consistent with recent work showing
the spatial persistence of economic activity over time—both across and within sector (for
example, Bleakley and Lin 2012, Krugman 1991, Ellison and Glaeser 1997, and Ellison,
Glaeser, and Kerr 2010)—we show that this result holds in an earlier period and in a wartime
shock setting. In addition, we highlight the importance of the local financial sector on local
economic activity (Rajan and Zingales 1998, Petersen and Rajan 2002, Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales 2004, Gilje 2013, and more recently in an historical context Ziebarth 2013 and
Lee and Mezzanotti 2014), providing evidence for this new channel through which financial
markets can affect the real economy.
Finally, our study of Sherman’s march complements the economic history literature on
the direct and indirect costs of the US Civil War. Goldin and Lewis (1975) estimated that
in the postbellum period, the former Confederate states had a lower per capita income than
other states and that income in the South fell after the war. Ransom and Sutch (2001)
argued this decline was driven by a reduction in labor supply among newly freed African
11As we discuss later, a social planner redistributing resources to reconstruct the economy may be a
substitute for developed financial markets. An example is the case of Vietnam analyzed by Miguel and
Roland (2011), but the government was very involved in the reconstruction efforts.
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Americans. Wright (1986), on the other hand, suggested that a postwar reduction in world
cotton demand—the South’s staple cash crop—hurt the Southern economy most. Temin
(1976) attempted to reconcile these explanations in light of the finding by Fogel and Enger-
man (1974) that plantation agriculture was more productive. Most recently, Khan (2015)
showed that the misallocation of resources during the war due to declining geographic mobi-
lity and increasing payoffs to military technologies were short-lived and did not inhibit the
long-term capacity of technological progress. Recent work in economic history has focused
on emancipation as a shock to the Southern financial system. Slave wealth was a frequent
source of collateral (Martin 2010, 2016) and emancipation both eliminated slaves as an asset
and made any lending-management practices backed by slave finance obselete.12 Gonza´lez,
Marshall, and Naidu (2016) found that slave owners were more likely than wealthy non-slave
owners to start businesses before emancipation but not afterwards.13 Our research design
focuses on local economic activity during and after the Civil War by comparing neighboring
counties that were similar economically and demographically prior to the war. Hence, we
are able to difference out many of the confounding effects in prior work and, in turn, isolate
the direct and indirect costs of destruction during war.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the history of Sher-
man’s march. Section 3 describes the historical data. Section 4 details our identification
strategy. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 examines mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.
12Martin (2016) refers to slavery as “a system of finance” and documents counties in Virginia, North
Carolina, and Louisiana where between 20 and 80% of loans and mortgages were backed by slaves. According
to Martin: “Among the many social and financial repercussions [of the Civil War] was that an enslaved labor
force was no longer available as collateral.”
13Two recent papers study the effects of emancipation as a wealth shock and trace the effects on interge-
nerational mobility from the antebellum to postbellum South (Ager, Boustan, and Eriksson 2016; Dupont
and Rosenbloom 2016).
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2 Sherman’s March and Reconstruction
2.1 The March: Historical Background
As the American Civil War progressed into 1864 and Union General Ulysses S. Grant plotted
the destruction of Confederate armies in Virginia, his colleague, General William Sherman,
trained his sights on the destruction of the Confederate economy and infrastructure (Tru-
deau 2008, p. 40). Sherman had just finished the successful Atlanta Campaign, a collection
of skirmishes from Chattanooga, TN through northwest Georgia during the late spring and
summer of 1864, which culminated in Atlanta’s capture on September 2, 1864. In Chattan-
ooga he had fought with Confederate armies led by Joseph E. Johnston and later John B.
Hood. Though bloody—with 4,423 Union dead and 3,044 Confederates dead—the Atlanta
Campaign was a conventional operation for its time with the two armies fighting one another
in large and small battles. For his next act, Sherman had something else in mind: he planned
to “enforce devastation” on the Southern states by “destroy[ing] mills, houses, cotton-gins,
&c.,” burning railroads and telegraph lines, and confiscating livestock and crops.14 He wrote
to Grant specifically of plans to “break roads and do irreparable damage” to the Southern
transportation network (Carr 2015, p. 55).
According to Civil War historians, Sherman used the prewar 1860 US Census of Agricul-
ture to carry out this mission (Trudeau 2008; Rubin 2014). In particular, he mapped out a
march path that traversed the agriculturally richest counties in Georgia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina while still following Grant’s orders to capture the important Southern cities
of Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia, and Columbia, South Carolina. Writing in December
1864, Sherman recalled how he “had the [1860] [C]ensus statistics showing the produce of
every county through which [he] desired to pass” and that he would destroy those counties
most abundant in agriculture. “No military expedition was ever based on sounder or surer
data,” he remarked (Trudeau 2008, p. 538).
14William T. Sherman, Military Division of the Mississippi Special Field Order 120, November 9, 1864 in
US War Department (1901); Lee (1995).
8
Based on our analysis of the 1860 Census of Agriculture, Sherman achieved his goal.
Figure 1 details the routes each of Sherman’s forces traveled. The Union Army started in
Atlanta and moved southeast to Savannah after several feints towards Macon and Augusta.
Following the capture of Savannah, Sherman’s forces marched north, through inland South
Carolina to Columbia. The final drive took the army northeast before defeating the only
Confederate Army remaining in the Carolinas near Goldsboro, North Carolina.15 In Table 1,
we see that in 1860, the counties in Sherman’s path—those counties inside a ten-mile band
of the main route shown in Figure 1—produced more crops, had far more livestock, and were
more valuable than their neighbors.16
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Table 1 about here.]
Upon completing this planning, Sherman undertook his march and wreaked substantial
destruction. He officially assigned more than 3,000 infantrymen each day to “foraging.”
Another 3,000 likely joined on many occasions, placing the true number closer to 6,000.17
The men destroyed hundreds of businesses, homes, farms, railroad lines, and telegraph lines,
and expropriated over 5,000 horses, 4,000 mules, 13,000 cattle, 10.5 million pounds of corn,
and 9.5 million pounds of fodder.18
15Goldsboro was a minor railroad connection that Sherman targeted once his army began marching through
North Carolina (Angley, Cross, and Hill 1995, p. 35). From March 19 to 21, 1865, the final fights of the
campaign took place in Bentonville, 20 miles from Goldsboro. Sherman arrived in Goldsboro, North Carolina
on March 23, 1865. From that point on, his army was supplied by rail from the north, ending the most
destructive aspects of the campaign. Grant wrote to Sherman on April 8, telling him that “the confederate
armies were the only strategic points at which to strike.” (Barrett 1956, p. 198-199).
16We discuss later how this result may affect our analysis. However, to the extent that these county
characteristics are time-invariant, we can control for them in our regression analysis by including county
fixed effects.
17Sherman issued orders regulating the destruction of property and foraging, but likely understood that
not all of the regulations would be followed. For example, while many of the fires he ordered were managed
by the Union Army Corp of Engineers, the controlled blazes often inspired infantrymen to set their own
fires, which frequently grew out of hand and engulfed whole sections of towns (Trudeau 2008, p. 128,
543). In addition, while soldiers often offered to pay for their takings, the payments were frequently made
in Confederate greybacks, which were not highly valuable by 1864 due to the Confederate government’s
large-scale printing efforts, and by war’s end were of no value.
18William T. Sherman, Military Division of the Mississippi Special Field Order 120, November 9, 1864 in
US War Department (1901); Lee (1995).
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Nor were Sherman’s men the only ones causing damage along the march path. Confe-
derate General Joseph Wheeler and his cavalry corps—the main Confederate opposition to
Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas—were also under strict orders from their superiors to
“destroy everything from which the enemy might derive sustenance” (Trudeau 2008, p. 85)
and “felled trees [and] burned bridges” (Barrett 1956, p. 50). In addition, Wheeler’s cavalry
requisitioned mules and horses and “burn[ed] up all the corn and fodder” (Glass Campbell
2006, p. 10). So severe was Wheeler in carrying out the orders that one Confederate officer
remarked that “the whole of Georgia is full of bitter complaints of Wheeler’s cavalry” (Bearss
1991, p. 127). Confederate General Beauregard too ordered his Georgia forces to “obstruct
and destroy all roads in Sherman’s front, flank, and rear...” (Trudeau 2008, p. 128).
This destruction along the march path marked the first time the war had meaningfully
visited Georgia and the Carolinas (Carr 2015, p. 134). Prior to the march, the only military
actions seen in those states were the few shots fired at Fort Sumter, South Carolina, to start
the war, a union blockade of the ports, and some minor skirmishes in North Carolina. The
larger battles, city sieges, and troop movements had taken place farther north or west.19
Noticing the relatively untouched countryside in the area prior to the 1864 march, one
Minnesota soldier among Sherman’s infantrymen wrote that “this part of Georgia [had]
never realized what war was until we came through on this expedition” (Trudeau 2008, p.
526). A Hillsboro, Georgia native remarked similarly that only when Sherman marched had
the “beloved [Georgia] country [been left] to desolation and ruin” (Trudeau 2008, p. 175).
Even foreign observers remarked on the novelty of war to the region: writing a travelogue
through the postbellum South, an English Member of Parliament recalled that Sherman
marched “through States which had never had the war brought home to them, or even seen
the blue uniform of their Yankee foes” (Kennaway 1867, p. 26).
19Before Sherman’s army departed Atlanta on November 15, 1864, there had only been 36 fighting events
in Georgia, North Carolina, or South Carolina, compared to 294 in all other states. More, only 8 of the
battles had had more than 500 total casualties. The median number of total casualties for Civil War fighting
events in all states was 513.
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2.2 Reconstruction
Even before the end of the Civil War, planning for the reconstruction and reintegration of the
South into the Union was underway. Reconstruction, dated by historians of the postbellum
period from 1863 to 1877, was overseen by Presidents Lincoln, Johnson, and Grant, as well
as the Republican Congress.
While the rebuilding of the national railroad infrastructure was a postbellum priority,
few other Reconstruction policies were focused on physical reconstruction. No attempts
were made to pay back private property owners whose capital had been destroyed during
the war.20 Nor was compensation offered to former slave owners of the Confederacy, as had
been common in past emancipation of slaves elsewhere in the western hemisphere (Goldin
1973).
Instead, Reconstruction focused on the reintegration of the South into the nation and
the legal revolution that ultimately granted citizenship and de jure rights to the formerly
enslaved African-American population.21 Along with constitutional amendments abolishing
slavery, guaranteeing citizenship, and granting the right to vote, Congress enacted several
statutes enabling Reconstruction. The creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau, the federal agency
tasked by Congress with transitioning former slaves into freedom, involved starting schools
for both children and adults, as well as provision of food and medical care to newly freed
African-Americans. The Freedman’s Saving and Trust Company, also known as the Freed-
man’s Savings Bank, was chartered in 1865. It made loans to African-American veterans
and newly freed slaves. Directly relevant to our identification strategy is that we have not
found any qualitative historical evidence of Reconstruction varying in implementation or fo-
cus—from the location of Freedmen’s Bureau schools or Freedman’s banks, to the protection
20Even Thaddeus Stevens, the powerful Radical Republican congressman from Pennsylvania, could not
extract repayment for destruction. An iron foundry he owned near Caledonia, PA was destroyed by a raid
led by Confederate General Jubal Early, an uncompensated loss Stevens later estimated at $50,000 (Egerton
2014, p. 212–213).
21These rights were largely striped at the end of the Reconstruction period when the planter class regained
power in the South (Naidu 2010).
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or enforcement of Constitutional Amendments—across Sherman march and non-march coun-
ties.
3 Historical Data
To investigate the economic effects of the war on march counties relative to non-march
counties, we gather historical data from five sources.
To start, we classify counties’ march status using the 1865 War Department map of
Sherman’s troop movements, shown in Figure 1. In the map, each line indicates the center
of march lines for each of five Sherman military units: the Right Wing (the 13th and 17th
Army Corps), the Left Wing (the 19th and 20th Army Corps), and the Cavalry. We digitally
trace each of these lines and consider as “march” counties all counties within five miles of a
line. Non-march counties are those outside of this 10-mile-wide band, but within 100 miles
of the lines and located in Georgia, North Carolina, or South Carolina. Figure 2 shows the
march and non-march counties in our sample. We select five miles as our primary march
bandwidth based on historical accounts that the marching soldiers and foragers did not
stray far from the main body of the Army (Trudeau 2008, p. 234). Our results are robust
to alternative march-distance definitions, as shown in the Appendix Section A.22
[Figure 2 about here.]
Second, we gather economic and demographic county-level data before and after the
march from the US Census, 1850-1920. Haines (2010) provides decadal, county-level, agri-
cultural production and asset value data, as well as demographic information for each county,
from the Census of Population, the Census of Agriculture, and the Census of Manufactures.
Newly digitized US Censuses of Manufactures report manufacturing data at the county-by-
industry level in 1860, 1870, and 1880 (Lee 2015b). From both sources, we extract data
22Given the high variation in quality of contemporary town-level maps, the troops assigned to forage may
have occasionally done so farther than 5 miles from the main line of the army. In the appendix, we also
show robustness to various definitions of the control county set.
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pertaining to the counties in the states of Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.
County-level data are standardized to 1860 county borders, using the county-intersection
procedure described in Hornbeck (2010).
Because the 1870 Census data were collected in a South that was still recovering from
the Civil War, one might worry about data quality. In particular, it would be problematic
if under-enumeration in march counties was more severe than it was in non-march coun-
ties.23 Heterogeneity in data quality across treatment could potentially bias our results in
an unknown direction, affecting the reliability of our estimates.
We use data on contemporary marriage records to show that data quality does not seem
to be different across treatment and control counties in the Census. Specifically, we test
whether men who appear in county marriage records in Georgia and North Carolina, two of
our sample states, between 1868 and 1872 are differentially likely to also appear in the 1870
Census based on whether the men were married in a march county or a non-march county.24
Table A.1 shows the match rates for each state and county type, finding no difference across
treatment. This suggests that there was not differential under-enumeration across march
and non-march counties and allays our concerns about comparing Census outcomes across
the two groups of counties.
To investigate the mechanisms behind any march and non-march differences, we augment
the Haines (2010) demographic information with three other data sets. The first are infra-
structure data from Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016) based on Atack, Bateman, Haines, and
Margo (2010): decadal railroad maps that indicate the exact location of all railroad lines
from 1850 through 1920. We intersect these railroad lines with 1860 US county boundaries
to calculate the number of railroad-track miles in each county in each decade.
23See Steckel (1991) and King and Magnuson (1995) on under-enumeration in historical census data gene-
rally. Reid (1995) documents under-enumeration in the 1870 census in North Carolina of African Americas,
particularly union veterans.
24The 1868–1872 county marriage records were digitized by the genealogical website FamilySearch.org. The
marriage records are collected locally by state and county governments, which contrasts with the Census
collected by Federal agents. Marriage records from South Carolina have not been digitized. The name
matching procedure follows the machine learning approach to record linkage developed in Feigenbaum (2016).
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The second two data sources used to consider the mechanisms driving our results are
local credit data from a pair of newly digitized sources. We collect bank-level entries in two
Merchants & Bankers Registers, 1859 and 1864, and firm-level records from Dun, Boyd, &
Company’s The Mercantile Agency’s 1860 Reference Book.25 The bank registries provide the
name, capitalization amount, and county of location for the approximately 1,800 state- and
nationally-chartered US banks in 1859 and 1864.26 The Dun, Boyd, & Company book lists
all firms tracked by Dun, Boyd, & Company, a credit-rating firm based in New York, New
York, as of 1860. For each firm, the book lists the name, city, and three credit ratings. In
various formats, historical DB data have recently been used by several papers in economic
history and finance (Brennecke 2016; Gonza´lez, Marshall, and Naidu 2016).27 We match the
city of each firm to an 1860 county and calculate the number of credit-tracked firms in each
county. The bank and DB data proxy for different types of local credit availability before
the march, allowing us to shed light on the importance of credit in driving our results.
4 Identification Strategy
Sherman’s objective was to “enforce devastation” on the South; our objective is to measure
how effective and persistent Sherman’s devastation was, estimating the direct effect of the
capital destruction caused by Sherman’s march on the local economy. We begin our ana-
lysis by comparing agricultural and manufacturing outcomes before and after the march,
across march and non-march counties. Depending on the outcome type, this differences-
in-differences fixed effect approach produces our two primary estimating equations. When
looking at agricultural outcomes, we use county level data between 1850 and 1920 and esti-
mate the following specification:
25The bank registries were scanned by the University of Wisconsin. We digitized them into a machine-
readable, manipulable format.
26The banks in 1859 were only state-chartered, as national-charter banks were not authorized until after
the National Banking Act of 1863 (Jaremski 2013).
27Brennecke (2016) provides a very detailed explanation of the data, the way they were collected, and the
general business model of Dun, Boyd, & Company around this period.
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Ycst = βt1[Sherman]c + δc + δst +Xcθt + cst (1)
where Ycst is agricultural outcome Y in county c and state s at time t, 1[Sherman]c is an
indicator equal to 1 if county c is within five miles of any Sherman’s march line, δc are
county fixed effects, δst are state-by-year fixed effects, Xc are 1860 county characteristics
that may predict differential post-march changes across march and non-march counties and
are interacted with year indicators, and cst is the error term. We interact the Sherman’s
march indicator with a full set of year-indicator variables—excluding 1860—to estimate the
difference in the outcomes between the march and non-march counties in each year, relative
to the year 1860 difference. Our sample includes all counties within 100 miles of any march
line.28 Negative estimates of βt for t > 1860 indicate lower agricultural outcomes in march
counties relative to non-march counties following the war.
There are three important elements of this specification. First, the county fixed effects
controls flexibly for time-invariant county characteristics such as the quality of soil, climate,
or latitude and longitude. To the extent that the 1860 agricultural outcomes Sherman
studied when planning his march path were determined by these types of time-invariant
characteristics, the county fixed effects control for these characteristics. Second, the state-
by-year fixed effects absorb any time-varying shocks common to all counties within a state
such as changes in the demand for cotton, state-specific business cycles, or changes in state
policy. Third, the 1860 county variables interacted with the full set of year dummies allow
us to disentangle the direct effects of the march from the differential effects of the war on
counties with different antebellum characteristics. The four 1860 characteristics we use are
size, as measured by square miles; population, frequently used as a historical proxy for
economic activity; the value of farmland; and the amount of cotton produced (Bleakley
and Lin 2012, Donaldson and Hornbeck 2016). Importantly, we also provide our results
28We only include in our sample counties in the three states where Sherman marched because, with state-
by-time fixed effects, we need within-state variation in the treatment to estimate Sherman effects.
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without the interacted 1860 controls, showing that the addition of controls has little effect
on our estimates.29 Therefore, our identification assumption is that, within the same state,
march counties would have experienced a similar change in postwar agricultural value as non-
march counties characterized by similar antebellum characteristics. While this assumption
is fundamentally untestable, we provide evidence consistent with its validity by studying
pre-shock trends in the outcomes. Furthermore, we also provide robustness checks of an IV
test and a placebo test, both of which can help us relax this identification assumption. More
discussion about these tests is presented later in the paper.
For agricultural outcomes, we look at measures of investments in land and the value of
the overall farming sector. In line with previous work in economic history (for example,
Hornbeck 2010), we proxy investment with the share of land improved for farming.30 This
measure is consistently measured across the 1850–1920 US Censuses of Agriculture. To
measure the value of the farming activity, we focus on two main measures: the value of the
farm and the value of the livestock. In the Appendix, we also examine the output of specific
crops and livestock, collected in great detail by the US Censuses of Agriculture.
For manufacturing, our production, capital, revenue, and employment data are at the
industry, county, and year levels between the decennial Censuses of 1860–1880. Therefore,
we also consider an alternative specification, which should have better properties than equa-
tion (1). In fact, this data structure allows us to control for time-varying industry shocks in
29For consistency, we report the estimates on both specifications—with and without controls—over the
same sample, excluding in the baseline specification the one county for which the 1860 controls are not
available.
30The Census of Agriculture defines improved acres of farmland as land in farms cleared for tillage, grazing,
grass, or lying fallow; unimproved areas are defined as uncultivated land connected to farms, including both
fertile and waste acres. Majewski and Tchakerian (2007) document lower shares of improved land in the
slave South, both before and after the Civil War. The authors argue these low shares reflect the common
Southern practice of shifting cultivation. In shifting cultivation, planters prepared acreage for farming by
burning forests and brush, releasing nutrients into the soil. They then farmed the burned area extensively
for five or six years. After exhausting the soil in one area, planters would let the land lay fallow for the next
twenty years, building the forest and brush back up naturally and moving on to other unimproved acreage
ripe for burning. These practices were common in counties in Sherman’s path and outside of it and we argue
that differences in improved acre share within the South reflect investment choices of farmers and planters.
For example, in 1860, counties with more slavery had more improved land, either because these counties
were wealthier in the antebellum period or because slave labor could be used to clear and improve acres.
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the South, as well as the level of county development in manufacturing. To accommodate
this different structure of the data and therefore avoid a large number of missing value that
the previous log-level specification would entail—in particular in the postbellum period—we
estimate a difference-in-difference fixed effect model with an alternative specification. In
particular, we collapse the panel differences-in-differences model, comparing the 1860–1870
growth rates of manufacturing outcomes across march and non-march counties. The speci-
fication is
∆Ycg(i)s,1860−1870 = βM1[Sherman]c + δg(i) + δs +Xc + c (2)
where Ycg(i)s is the percentage change from 1860–1870 in manufacturing outcome Y in
county c, industry group g (i), where i denotes industry, and state s, 1[Sherman]c is an
indicator equal to 1 if county c is within five miles of any Sherman’s march line, and c
is the error term.31 Furthermore, we augment this specification with industry-group fixed
effects δg(i) and state fixed effects δs.
32 The industry-group fixed effects control flexibly for
industry-group characteristics such as demand. The state fixed effects absorb any shocks
common to all counties within a state such as changes in the state-specific business cycles
or state policy changes. As in the previous specification, we also control for county-specific
1860 characteristics, such as size, population, value of farmland, and cotton production. The
sample is again all counties within 100 miles of any march line. Negative estimates of βM
indicate lower manufacturing growth rates in march counties relative to non-march counties
from 1860 to 1870.
31Growth rates are winsorized at 1% at each tail.
32The industry group is generated using the industry groupings introduced in the Census of Manufactures
in 1900. These groupings were precursors to the Standard Industrial Classification 2-digit groupings, which
were introduced in the Census of Manufactures in 1939. In order to apply these year 1900 groupings to the
1860 to 1880 data, we convert all 1860 to 1880 industry classifications into year 1900 industry classifications.
The procedure we use for the conversion is based on Lee (2015a). We also run these regressions excluding




Comparing Sherman’s march to non-march counties using the differences-in-differences spe-
cification previously described, we find economically large and statistically significant post-
march differences among agricultural outcomes. Table 2 shows the results. After the march,
the value of farming activities and investment in agriculture declined substantially. In par-
ticular, the share of improved land, the value of farms, and the value of livestock declined
between 14% to 21% more in march counties from 1860 to 1870 relative to the non-march
counties. The findings are similar across the specifications with and without controls. Over-
all, these results show that the capital destruction caused by Sherman’s march substantially
affected the local agricultural economy, with the effects still visible in 1870, six years later.33
[Table 2 about here.]
Moreover, we find that some of the negative effects persisted long after the march—as
late as 1920, more than five decades later. We find persistence of the negative effects across
both the value and investment measures; however, the results are more precisely estimated
with investment. In particular, we find that the initial decline of about 15% in the share of
improved land remains extremely stable in magnitude and in statistical significance at least
until 1920. Figure 3 confirms graphically the results presented in Table 2, by showing the
persistent differences between march and non-march counties in both the share of improved
land and the farm values following the march. To strengthen our claim that the effects were
fairly persistent also for the other outcomes, we perform for each agricultural outcome a joint
test of significance for the effects between 1870-1890. In this way, we confirm that the effect
is indeed present for more than 30 years after the march across all the outcomes, despite
33These negative results are consistent with the historical record. In the immediate antebellum period,
farming was done with “Sherman horses,” the old, “sore-backed” and “abused” animals the Union Army
had swapped for fresh rides along the path of the march (Rubin 2014, p. 50-51).
18
the potential noise in the year-specific estimates of the coefficients. Across the different
outcomes, we always find that the negative effects are on average highly significant from
1870 to 1890.34
[Figure 3 about here.]
Importantly, these results are not driven by differential trends across treatment before
the march. In each specification, the coefficient on the 1850 dummy is relatively small in
size and never statistically significant. Alternatively, this is also confirmed by Table A.2,
which presents a comparison of the 1850 to 1860 changes in agricultural outcomes across the
treatment.
The destruction of Sherman’s march is also apparent in more detailed crop- and livestock-
level outcomes measured in the agricultural census. Output of crops like corn, oats, wool,
as well as counts of livestock assets like mules and pigs were all relatively lower in Sherman
counties after the war (see Table A.8). The decline in livestock is consistent with the historical
accounts from the march: Southerners recalled large-scale slaughter of livestock, either to be
eaten by the Union Army or left to rot in the field (Rubin 2014, p. 51).35 Sherman’s march
had an immediate and persistent negative effect on the agricultural output of march counties
relative to nearby, non-march counties. Given the importance of agriculture in the economies
of late nineteenth century Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, this represented a
substantial economic loss for march counties relative to non-march counties.
Turning to manufacturing data, we find that Sherman also reduced manufacturing acti-
vity in the South. We first analyze county manufacturing aggregates in Table 3. We are
34We perform this test as a Chi-squared test of the equality to zero of the coefficients in the interaction
between the treatment and the year dummy for 1870, 1880, and 1890. We find that the p-values are smaller
than 1% for livestock and improved land, and less than 3% for the value of farms. All tests are performed
with the specification augmented with 1860 controls.
35Fite (1984) details the rise of cotton, as livestock farming fell out of favor in the postbellum period.
However, our identification strategy allows us to difference out any aggregate Southern trends and examine
variation between Sherman and non-Sherman counties. It is possible to read our livestock results as either a
direct effect of Sherman’s march or as an indirect consequence: Weiman (1985) suggests that the indebted
farmers in Georgia were pushed into cotton out of livestock and corn production for home consumption by
wartime damage and debt to local merchants.
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constrained slightly by the limited nature of the 1850 Census of Manufactures, but we ob-
serve declines in employment, capital, manufacturing establishments, and production in the
Sherman counties after the war, echoing our agriculatural findings.36 However, while these
results are all relatively large, they are quite imprecise: only the effects on capital are sta-
tistically significant. In particular, capital in Sherman counties declined 30% more than in
non-Sherman counties. However, there are two main issues with county-aggregated manu-
facturing data. First, there is a good deal of heterogeneity in manufacturing specialization
across counties. Very few counties specialized in the same set of industries. Second, the
1860-1870 decades were characterized by a large variation in demand across industries. In
particular, wartime itself likely led to an increase in demand for certain industries, while
impairing others. Furthermore, this period was characterized by a lot of transformations in
the manufacturing sector (Engerman 1966). This heterogeneity across industries—even if
unrelated to the location of Sherman’s march—may increase the noise in the data and could
therefore make it harder to detect march effects in aggregate data. However, we have col-
lected county-by-industry data at the decade level for 1860, 1870, and 1880 that enables us
to account for any such county and industry heterogeneity, including time-varying industry
shocks or variation across counties in manufacturing specialization.
[Table 3 about here.]
Using these county-by-industry data, we examine the differential growth rates from 1860
to 1870 along four manufacturing outcomes for march and non-march counties in Table 4.
Overall, we find that the number of establishments grew substantially more slowly in march
counties than in non-march counties following the war, as did value added, employment and
capital. These results are large in magnitude: for instance, establishment growth in Sherman
counties was about 50% lower than in non-Sherman counties. The point estimates are very
close across specifications with and without controls. Moreover, as with the agricultural
36Establishment data are not available for 1850.
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results, these differences in manufacturing growth rates were not simply the result of pre-
march trends, as we find no difference in aggregate manufacturing growth.37
[Table 4 about here.]
Exploiting further the industry level of our data, we test whether within a special “war”
industry such as lumber, the effect of the shock was particularly large. Prior to the march,
75 percent of the counties in the sample had at least one lumber establishment, making
the industry the most geographically prevalent manufacturing industry in the data. We find
suggestive evidence of relative declines in lumber, even with far fewer observations than in our
county-by-industry growth-rate analysis.38 Table A.3 indicates that capital among lumber
mills in march counties grew 51 percent more slowly than it did in non-march counties
between 1860 and 1870—statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The number of
establishments, value added, and employment also grew more slowly, but the coefficients
are less precisely estimated. Hence, among prevalent and Sherman-targeted industries, the
post-march relative declines were substantial. The economic destruction of Sherman’s march
extended beyond the agricultural sector and into Southern manufacturing.
However, the effects on manufacturing do not appear to be particularly persistent in the
long term, as we show in the second panel of Table 4. This difference with agricultural
outcomes can be explained in two ways. First, the lack of persistence may reflect that the
manufacturing data are nosier, a hypothesis we cannot exclude. Second, this result may
be explained by the strong development in the manufacturing sector in the postwar period,
which is a confounding factor when studying local differences in development over a longer
horizon. In fact, while the manufacturing sector was still small and underdeveloped in the
South before 1860, overall manufacturing grew substantially in the second part of the century
relative to the prewar level; after declining from $71M in 1860 to $57M in 1870, Southern
37We do not have data at the industry level prior to 1860; therefore this pre-trend test can only be
performed at the aggregate manufacturing sector level and not by industry-group.
38Sherman also targeted the pine forests and resin pits in the Carolinas, the main inputs for the large
South Carolina turpentine and tar industries (Carr 2015, p. 91).
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manufacturing and mining output grew to $100M in 1880 (Engerman 1966).
Overall, the capital destruction following General Sherman’s march led to a strong con-
traction in land values, agricultural investments, and manufacturing output. In addition,
the agricultural declines persisted for decades and in some cases through 1920. These ef-
fects are not driven by differential trends in economic outcomes across march and non-march
counties. In other words, we find that Sherman succeeded in bringing economic destruction
to the parts of the South through which he marched.
5.2 Robustness
In this section, we provide three main robustness tests to our results. First, we employ
an instrumental variable estimator to address the potential endogeneity of the march path.
Second, we create a placebo march, connecting other large cities in the region to ensure that
our results are not driven by a county’s geographic position relative to cities. In both cases,
the robustness tests support our argument: the instrumental variables estimates largely
confirm our main results and the placebo march shows no effect. Lastly, we show that the
results are similar across different definitions of treatment and control groups.
5.2.1 Robustness: Instrumental Variables Estimator
Sherman’s path was not a random walk. As historians have documented—and as we con-
firmed—the course was plotted based on available economic data from the 1860 Census.
Even if the selection we have documented would likely work against our findings, we are
still concerned about endogeneity. One worry would be that some unmeasured, time-varying
county characteristic was correlated with the path Sherman chose and explains our results.
Our inclusion in the main specification of both county fixed effects and state-by-decade fixed
effects, as well as level controls measured in 1860, makes this unlikely, but it cannot rule this
possibility out.
To fully assuage these concerns, we instrument for Sherman’s march path with a straight-
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line path between the vertices of the actual march. To replicate the approximate width of
Sherman’s march, we define as treated any county within 15 miles of the straight line between
the march vertices.39 Sherman was specifically targeting the main cities—Atlanta, Savannah,
and Columbia—but many of the counties between these cities were likely hit only because
they were on the way along the march.40 This instrument is likely to satisfy the standard
exclusion restrictions: counties between these cities should not be expected to have grown
less quickly, but for Sherman destroyed many of them during the war. The F-stat on the
first stage is 126.4, suggesting that although Sherman took deviations from the straight
line, in particular when approaching the coastal area, the path of the march can roughly be
approximated by a straight line between the main cities.
Overall, this straight-line IV analysis bolsters the findings of our main estimates: Sher-
man’s march had large, negative economic effects on both agriculture and manufacturing,
and a number of agricultural declines persisted for several decades. The results, which are
shown in Tables A.4 for agriculture and A.5 for manufacturing, are similar in sign and
magnitude to the OLS results in Tables 2 and 4, though they are less precise.
5.2.2 Robustness: Placebo March
As a second robustness test, we develop a placebo march line to show that differences in
postbellum economic responses across counties between cities and counties not between cities
cannot explain our results. While the straight-line instrument addresses the concern that
an unmeasured, time-varying county characteristics correlated with the path Sherman chose
could explain the differential postwar agricultural and manufacturing outcomes, this placebo
test exploits inevitable variation across counties that are located between the major cities
39In the main results, we defined as treated any counties within five miles of one of Sherman’s units’ march
lines. However, because the march was undertaken by five units (the 13th and 17th Army Corps in the Right
Wing, the 19th and 20th Army Corps in the Left Wing, and Kilpartick’s cavalry), in order to match the
effective width of the true treatment with the straight-line instrument, we expand the treatment radius to
be 15 miles on either side of the line.
40It is important to remember that, exactly because of any endogeneity concerns about the cities, these
three cities are dropped from all analyses, as is Goldsboro, the town where the march ended after the
Confederate opposition surrendered. These exclusions do not affect the results.
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compared with the rest of the sample. This is problematic if these counties are exposed to
different shocks in the postbellum economy because of their special location between major
economic hubs.
[Figure 4 about here.]
To allay these concerns, our placebo test compares changes in agricultural and manufactu-
ring activities across a fictional treatment that is composed of counties between major cities
that were not affected by the march.41 This placebo path starts in Atlanta, goes through
another major city that Sherman targeted and, as in the case of the real march, ends in
a coastal city.42 In particular, we run the same regressions in equations 1 and 2, except
we augment the specification with placebo-treatment variables as being within fifteen miles
of the straight-line path between Atlanta, Columbia, and Charleston, as shown in Figure
4, rather than Atlanta, Savannah, Columbia, and Goldsboro.43 Tables A.6 and A.7 show
that when we use this alternative group of between-city counties, we do not detect the same
significant declines between placebo-march and non-placebo-march counties. In fact, we find
no differences in changes in both agricultural and manufacturing outcomes right around the
placebo march.
The results from an additional placebo march path test further strengthens our confidence
in the results. Rather than construct a plausible Sherman’s march path in Georgia, North
Carolina, and South Carolina, we constract all possible match paths in the Confederacy
outside these states. The straight-line distance from Atlanta to Savannah is 270 miles;
Savannah to Columbia is 164 miles. In this spirit, we create all possible connections of three
Confederate cities—defined as counties with more than 5000 urban residents in 1860—where
each line segment is between 100 and 300 miles. Excluding paths through the three Sherman
41As with the instrument, we use a 15-mile radius around the straight line paths in order to replicate the
roughly 30-mile wide path made by all of Sherman’s units put together.
42In the placebo case, the path ends in Charleston, SC.
43It is important to highlight that the real treatment is also included in the specification. Since the placebo
and treatment are correlated in this setting—due to the geographical structure of our data—we control for
the real treatment to rule out that our results were driven by spurious correlation.
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states, there are 341 paths, many in between Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and others
in Virginia. We then define treatment and control indicators in the usual way—treatment
for counties within 15 miles of the paths, controls counties within 100 miles—and estimate
seperate regressions for each placebo path, echoing the form of 1. The results for the effect
of these placebo paths on improved acreage share are presented in Figure 5. The estimated
effects on improved acre share are most negative in the true Sherman’s march regression,
highlighted in blue in the figure. Further, while some placebo marches in some years have
more negative effects, none display the persistent decline in improved acre share and the
pre-treatment balance of the true Sherman’s march effects.
[Figure 5 about here.]
5.2.3 Robustness: Different Treatment Definitions
Lastly, we also show that our results are not driven by the specific definition of treatment
and control counties that we use in our main results. As discussed before, our main results
consider as treated the counties within 5 miles of Sherman’s march and as a control those
within 100 miles. The treatment bandwidth is based on the historical record: Sherman’s
troops could only “forage” so far away from the relative safety of the main army. We chose
the 100-mile control bandwidth as a reasonable trade off between including more counties
from Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina and not including counties in those states
that were very different from the counties Sherman laid to waste. In Figure 6a, we test the
robustness of our bandwidth choices by presenting estimates of the short-term (1870) effect
of the march across different treatment definitions—5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 miles—keeping
the control group constant. We find that these alternative definitions of treatment provide
very similar results, both statistically and economically. For instance, the estimates using
10 miles are always indistinguishable from the 5-mile results across all the main agricultural
outcomes. However, as we use a broader definition of treatment, we tend to find smaller
and less significant results. In fact, this finding is reassuring about our identification: as we
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increase the bandwidth for the treatment, we are bundling together both counties that were
struck by Sherman with areas that were most likely unaffected.
We also show that our control-bandwidth choice is not driving our findings in Figure 6b.
We repeat the same procedure as above, but keeping the treatment definition as constant
(at 5 miles) and changing the control. Specifically, we consider 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, and
150 mile bandwidths as potential control groups. Again, we find similar results: the point
estimates of our 1870 Sherman effects are extremely stable across specifications. The effects
are generally less precisely estimated when we employ a very tight control group—25 or 50
miles—reflecting both the small sample size and the possible contamination of treatment
into the control counties.
[Figure 6 about here.]
These results confirm that our definition of treatment and control group is not driving
our results. As a last step, we repeat this bandwidth test in the regression framework used
previously and examine the Sherman effects in all years. In Table A.9, we use a definition
of treatment of 10 miles, keeping the control at 100 miles as before. Also in this case, we
find no particular difference with respect to our main results. Similarly, in Table A.10, we
show how the main findings do not change when we use only counties 75 miles from the
march as a control group, rather than 100 miles. Despite a substantial reduction in the
sample, we find no main differences across the main results. The choice of treatment and
control bandwidths does not affect our manufacturing results either. When using 10 miles
as an alternative treatment (Table A.12), we are able to replicate all our results, though the
estimates in this case are less precisely estimated. Similarly, tightening the control group
does not significantly change our conclusion, as we show in Table A.11: the only difference
from the main result is a loss of significance for the manufacturing-employment outcome
when we add the 1860 controls.
Overall, these robustness tests increase our confidence that the relative declines we detect
in Sherman counties were indeed due to the destructive path of Sherman’s march. In the
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next section, we consider what mechanisms could explain these declines.
6 The Role of Credit Markets in the Recovery
The capital destruction caused by Sherman’s march had strong, negative effects: the march
led to a contraction in investments and asset prices in the agricultural sector and a reduction
in manufacturing growth in the decade after the war. Furthermore, the decline in agriculture
was persistent, with some effects being detected in the 1920s. Overall, these results confirm
that the effects of capital destruction may generate long-lasting costs for an economy.
The presence of long-term real effects of capital destruction is partially at odds with
a relatively large strand of economic literature, both empirical and theoretical. Standard
neo-classical growth models predict that capital destruction should not affect long-term
economic performances, because the temporary shock should be followed by a rapid growth,
which brings the economy back to the original steady state. In line with this hypothesis, past
studies have found no long-term effects of physical and human capital destruction induced
by wartime events. As mentioned earlier, Ikle (1952) studied this in the context of the
Allied bombing of German cities during World War II and found that bombed cities rebuilt
fairly quickly after the war. Davis and Weinstein (2002) similarly showed rapid postwar
reconstruction of Japanese cities destroyed during WWII. More recently, Miguel and Roland
(2011) found that Vietnamese districts severely damaged by the United States in the late
1960s and early 1970s also rebuilt shortly after fighting ceased. Lastly, some papers even
find no effect at all following large natural disasters, even in the very short run (Porcelli,
Trezzi, et al. 2014).
The standard neo-classical model implicitly assumes the presence of perfect financial mar-
kets or alternatively the presence of a social planner that efficiently redistribute the resources
in the economy.44 If these assumptions fail, a temporary shock to the stock of capital can
44For instance, the case of Vietnam discussed by Miguel and Roland (2011) is a situation where credit
markets were not particularly developed but the government had a first order role in the reconstruction
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affect economic activity in the medium and long run, since reconstruction efforts are limi-
ted by individual financial constraints rather than driven by only investment opportunities.
Therefore, when resources are optimally deployed ex ante, full reconstruction may not be
achieved for quite some time. More generally, these imperfections may negatively affect the
overall path to recovery.
In our case, it is reasonable to think that the weakness of credit markets after the Civil
War may explain the strength of the effects of the march in the short and medium run. In
fact, the overall US banking sector was not particularly developed in the antebellum period
(Jaremski 2013), and this underdevelopment was even more acute in the South (Ransom
and Sutch 2001). Bensel (1991) argues that the South was capital starved, and this was
particularly true in the rural and agrarian parts of the region. The 1859 Merchants & Bankers
Register data reveal that both North Carolina and South Carolina had only 2.9 banks for
every 100 thousand people, while Georgia had 6.2 banks per 100 thousand, compared with
the national average of 7.1 per 100 thousand.
For farmers, the supply of formal credit was even more restricted, since banks did not
primarily serve rural and agricultural needs during this period, in particular in the South
(Fite 1984; Jaremski and Rousseau 2012).45 Instead, previous research has suggested that
most of the funding in the agricultural sector was coming from within the sector, with local,
wealthier landowners providing credit for other farmers during bad times or between harvests
(Rajan and Ramcharan 2008, 2011; Jaremski and Fishback 2016). For instance, Rajan and
Ramcharan (2011) argue that before the Great Depression, local landowning elites actively
tried to restrict the development of a local banking sector to maintain monopoly power in
the provision of credit to small farmers. While Jaremski and Fishback (2016) disagree in
part with some of the conclusions in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011), both papers highlight
the importance of local landowning elites in the provision of credit for farmers. As we discuss
effort.
45According to Fite (1984, p. 27), the Southern banking system in this period “was entirely inadequate
to meet rural needs.”
28
later, this difference across agricultural and manufacturing sectors has relevant implications
for our analysis.
Furthermore, the banking sector in the South was deeply impaired by the war and slow
to recover to even these meager antebellum levels (James 1981). The bank registries indicate
that as of 1864, no state- or nationally-chartered bank existed in Georgia, North Carolina,
or South Carolina. The Comptroller of the Currency’s 1864 Report to the US Treasury
documents the same.46 The first postbellum banks did not open until 1866 in Georgia, North
Carolina, and South Carolina. By 1870, Georgia still had only 9 banks; North Carolina
6; and South Carolina a mere 3. There were far fewer banks in these states relative to
any Northern state. Moreover, as Atack and Passell (1994) note, this modest “growth
in the number of banks after the war masks a sharp reduction in total bank assets from
prewar levels.” So scarce were bank assets that most lending was done by local general
stores. Even those, however, “made frequent errors of judgment ... and failed and exited
the business” (Atack and Passell 1994, p. 393). Therefore, financing may have been difficult
to obtain in the postbellum South. Figure 7 suggests that access to formal credit was also
negatively impacted by the Sherman’s march. Furthermore, unlike the other destruction
settings previously cited, this underdeveloped financial sector was not compensated by large
public reconstruction programs, as Reconstruction focused primarily on helping freed slaves
transition out of slavery, rather than rebuilding public or private infrastructure. Lastly, the
overall weakness in credit was also exacerbated by the slave emancipation—which removed
one important source of collateral for landowners (Gonza´lez, Marshall, and Naidu 2016;
Martin 2010, 2016)—and the default of the Confederate States on their obligation.
While the weakness of the Southern financial sector in the postwar period is apparent, its
importance for the recovery process cannot be taken for granted. In fact, this is not the only
possible explanation for our results. The remainder of this section provides three pieces of
empirical evidence suggesting that credit markets played an important role in delaying and
46The Southern banking sector collapsed as a whole during the war: according to Jaremski (2013), 170 of
223 banks closed in 1863 and 1864.
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weakening the relative recovery. First, we show that the two leading alternative channels
affecting the relative recovery—a demographic shift after the war and the destruction of
public infrastructure—are not confirmed by data. Second, we provide direct evidence that
the lack of credit was an important element in explaining the relative growth rates of the
manufacturing sectors in the years immediately after the war.47 Third, we show that in the
agricultural sector, too, frictions in the credit market are relevant in explaining the recovery.
In particular, because the formal banking sector played little role in financing agriculture in
this period in the South, we show that the postbellum agricultural recovery was slower in
counties with fewer large landholders—an important source of credit in the underdeveloped
South—and land concentration increased in Sherman counties. We now turn to discussing
in greater detail the interpretation and implementation of these tests.
6.1 Alternative Channels: Demographic Shifts and Infrastructure
The effects of capital destruction may be magnified if the shock also affects the demographic
structure of the population, reducing the labor supply of white and newly freed blacks.
Ransom and Sutch (2001) argue that changes in labor supply help explain the postbellum
decline in economic activity in the South as a whole compared with the North. For the
enslaved populations of Georgia and the Carolinas, the arrival of Union troops signaled
freedom. Catton (1988, vol. 3, p. 415-416) estimates that more than 10,000 slaves were
freed during the march. Moreover, Sherman not only freed the slaves in his path, but he
also signed Field Order No. 15, which allowed the freed slaves to settle outside the march
path in abandoned coastal plantations (Trudeau 2008, p. 521). Ransom and Sutch (2001)
estimate high rates of out-migration among freedpeople, but we will investigate whether that
out-migration differed between march counties and non-march counties.
In addition to potentially divergent postwar demographic patterns, the rebuilding and
47We do not examine the effects of the lack of bank credit on agricultural outcomes because the formal
banking sector played little role in financing agriculture in the antebellum and postbellum periods in the
South.
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development of new public infrastructure in the postbellum period could have been different
between march and non-march counties. We know that wartime destruction of infrastructure
varied between the march and non-march counties because Sherman explicitly targeted the
railroads and telegraph lines in his path. Prior to the march, Georgia, North Carolina, and
South Carolina had more than 2, 700 miles of railroad track. Sherman laid siege to this track
by assigning a large share of his men the specific job of destroying the tracks and nearby
depots, warehouses, station buildings, and bridges (Carr 2015, p. 69). His soldiers sent home
vivid letters describing how they would lift up track in concert, soften the steel with bonfires,
wrap the track around trees, and bend it into bows known as “Sherman’s neckties” (Carr
2015, p. 70).48 Between Atlanta and Savannah alone, Sherman claimed to have destroyed 310
miles of track (Trudeau 2008, p. 533). These claims may be exaggerations, as much of the
destruction was incomplete and his men concentrated more on pulling up rails and breaking
ties than on fully destroying rail paths and grounds. This made postwar re-laying of track
fairly fast (Trudeau 2008, p. 92). Nevertheless, the potential for differential infrastructure
across march and non-march counties following Sherman’s march could also help explain the
observed economic differences.
Using county-level data on demographic structure and infrastructure, we find that neither
channel is particularly useful in explaining our results in either the short term or the long
term. Table 5 shows the results of estimating equation 1 on the demographic and infrastruc-
ture outcomes. Columns 1 and 2 indicate that there were not systematically different postwar
in- or out-migration rates overall; columns 3 and 4 indicate no differences for migration of
newly freed African Americans across the march and non-march counties.49 Demographics
do not appear to explain much of the economic effects of the march. We only find some
very weak effects on population, but these effects are specification-dependent, small, and not
consistent over time. Our results echo many histories of the postbellum South: if newly freed
48Barrett (1956) describes in detail the Union army process of destroying a railroad, including the need
to bend the wrap into a twisted doughnut shape, known as a “Lincoln gimlet” (Barrett 1956, p. 51).
49We find similar results on a battery of other demographic outcomes such as sex ratio.
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slaves “showed a reluctance to leave the places where they had lived and worked” (Glass
Campbell 2006, p. 49), that reluctance was not differential across counties decimated by
Sherman and not. Similarly, the last four columns show that differences in infrastructure, as
measured by county railroad miles, were also small.50 This is consistent with the historical
record: Atack and Passell (1994, p. 378-379) notes that while rail and telegraph lines were
“destroyed with great vigor by the Union,” the “repairs were immediate.” According to
Rubin (2014, p. 154), many travelers remarked on the speed with which the Georgia Central
Railroad was rebuilt in the few years after the war. The telegraph repair was even more
rapid: as soon as December 13, 1864, while Sherman was still sieging Savannah, the Sout-
hern Telegraph Company had already repaired many of the cut wires, quickly reestablishing
communication between Macon and Augusta. Given these rapid repairs and the exagge-
rated reports of railroad destruction by Sherman, it is perhaps unsurprising that postwar
infrastructure was not different across march and non-march counties.
[Table 5 about here.]
These results suggest that differences in either demographic composition or infrastructure
cannot explain the Sherman effects. Importantly, this is true both in the long and short-run,
since we do not find any significant effects on these outcomes even in 1870, six years after
the starting of the events.
6.2 Credit in the Manufacturing Recovery
After excluding the previous channels, in this section and the next we provide some direct
evidence on the importance of the financial channel in explaining the relative recovery from
the Sherman destruction. We begin by exploring the role of credit in the manufacturing
50Since railroads are often zero in counties, we report this result both as a normal log-transformation and
adding one to the log-transformation to avoid having missing values in the analysis. In both cases, we find no
effect of the march. The use of alternative outcomes (miles of railroads without transformation, an indicator
for counties with railroads) produce similar results.
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recovery; in the next section, we show how access to credit blunted the persistent, negative
effects of wartime destruction.
Jaremski (2014) documents the important role the formal banking sector in this period
played in encouraging the growth of manufacturing. Banks and credit were both scarce in
the postbellum period. However, for some areas of the south, this scarcity was not a new
phenomenon: banking coverage throughout Georgia and the Carolinas was quite variable in
the antebellum period as well. Therefore, if a weak banking sector made the recovery more
difficult, we would expect to find larger negative effects in counties where the reduction in
bank credit was a change from the antebellum era.
To test this hypothesis, we collect county-level data on the number of banks in 1859
and the number of firms receiving a credit rating from Dun, Boyd, & Company in 1860.
Using these data, we define as more dependent on credit markets those counties that are
located closer to a bank in 1859 or that have firms which appear to have credit extended
according to the 1860 Dun, Boyd, & Company report. This sorting identifies places where
credit markets were more active before the war, and therefore, because all 1859 banks were
destroyed by 1864 (Figure 7), where the contraction of credit caused by the march was more
costly. If access to credit helps explain the postbellum manufacturing recovery, we expect
that counties more dependent on credit should suffer more for a given level of destruction.
The counties with access to credit under these two measures are mapped in Figure A.1.
We find that the negative effect caused by the march is much stronger for those counties
that were ex ante more dependent on finance (Table 6, top panel). Formally, we first divide
the sample into counties that were above or below the median distance to a bank in 1859. We
consider counties below the median distance as counties that experienced significant wartime
credit disruption.51 We then estimate manufacturing change regression from equation 2,
51In 1859, 51 of the 248 counties in Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina contained a bank. The
median county centroid distance to an 1859 bank was 23.35 miles. Counties with a bank are considered 0
miles from a bank. Atack and Passell (1994, p. 392) suggest that trips to banks out of county or farther,
taking two days, could have been prohibitively costly for small farmers who had “neither the time nor the
skills” to negotiate with bankers out of town. Further, these bankers would know little of the small farmers’
credit risk or land and might be hesitant to lend.
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interacting the march treatment with the indicator of finance access. We find that the
Sherman’s damage on manufacturing was stronger in counties that also experienced the
disappearance of a local banking network. 52
[Figure 7 about here.]
The Dun, Boyd, & Company data tell a similar story. March counties with Dun-tracked
firms in 1860 were more adversely affected by the march than march counties without Dun-
tracked firms, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 6. This regression also demonstrates
that when places with more credit relationships external to the firm—in this case, to Dun
lenders rather than banks—were damaged, recovery was slower. Hence, whether the access
to credit came from banks or non-bank sources, the credit channel played an important
role in the postbellum rebuilding and can help explain the divergent economic results across
march and non-march counties.
[Table 6 about here.]
Our investigation of the mechanisms driving our differential economic results across march
and non-march counties indicates that access to credit played an important role, while de-
mographic and infrastructure differences were less crucial. In particular, counties that were
more dependent on financing before the war experienced a more difficult recovery, as the
war also led to a severe disruption in credit markets. These findings are consistent with
the historical literature showing the rapid rebuilding of infrastructure in the postwar period
(Atack and Passell 1994) and the importance of credit for manufacturing growth later in
American history (Nanda and Nicholas 2014; Ziebarth 2013; Lee and Mezzanotti 2014).
To the extent that Sherman’s march directly impaired financial intermediaries, our main
estimates may partially capture the negative effect of this direct effect. However, when we
52In Table A.14, we show that the results are robust to an alternative measure of the credit shock. In
particular, we calculate the growth rate of banks from 1859 to 1870 and split the sample at the median
growth rate. This measure captures more directly the heterogeneity across counties in banking drop after
the War. However, as also suggested by Figure 7, this measure is endogenous to the march itself, since
post-1864 banking reconstruction will be a function of the reconstruction in manufacturing. Therefore, we
prefer the main specification based only on 1859 banks not the growth rate of banks.
34
examine heterogeneity in Sherman’s effects, our results do not rely on an assumption that
Sherman had a differential effect on the banking sector because we use antebellum access to
banking and credit as our measure of treatment intensity. While, it may be the case that
banks in Sherman counties recovered slower, as Figure 7 shows, any differential recovery in
banking activity across Sherman and non-Sherman counties is second-order compared with
the overall drop in banking activity in the South during and after the Civil War, a decline
experienced similarly across all counties in our sample.
However, the postbellum Southern economy was more agrarian than industrial and banks
had a limited role in the agricultural sector. Instead, credit for farmers often came from local
large landowners. In the next section, we investigate this type of credit in the Sherman’s
march recovery.
6.3 Agricultural Recovery and Credit
In order to provide evidence of the importance of credit-market imperfection for the agri-
cultural sector, we present two results that exploit the institutional characteristics of this
sector around the Civil War.
As previously discussed, the agricultural sector was not particularly dependent on banks
during this period (Fite 1984; Jaremski and Rousseau 2012). Instead funding in this area
was mostly provided within the sector (Rajan and Ramcharan 2011; Jaremski and Fishback
2016). In this setting, large local landowners played a very important role in the economy.
First, these farmers were less in need of external financial resources, either because they
had more non-farm wealth or because the scale of their businesses made internal funding of
reconstruction less difficult. In line with this idea, large land ownership also strongly predicts
large non-farm wealth in the aftermath of the Civil War. For instance, we find that in 1870
individuals in the top 10% of real estate wealth—a proxy for land ownership—have a 68%
chance of being in the top 10% in personal wealth as well.53 Second, the presence of local
53The overlap between the top of the real estate and personal wealth distributions are similar for other
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large landowners generated positive externalities, serving as an alternative source of funding
for smaller farmers in the absence of accessible formal financial institutions. Therefore,
either directly or by providing funding to others, large wealthy landowners could facilitate
the funding of reconstruction and reduce the costs related to the lack of external credit. To
provide evidence that would be consistent with the importance of credit-market imperfections
in explaining the recovery, we bring this mechanism to the data.
We start by drawing on the 1860 agricultural census and count the number of farms
larger than 1000 acres. This threshold—1000 acres—is the largest farm size categorization
in the Census of Agriculture and allows us to identify the share of large land farmers in the
overall population of farmers. We define high-wealth counties to be those where the share
of large landowners is in the top quartile of the distribution in 1860. Based on the previous
discussion, our hypothesis is that, if financial frictions mattered in the recovery, places with a
high share of large landowners should enjoy a better recovery after the large shock to capital
of Sherman’s march. In order to test this idea, we augment our standard regression model
interacting our treatment dummy and time dummy with the high-wealth variable. Since the
main coefficients of interest will be on a triple interaction, we simplify the time dummies
to before and after the march indicators, reporting in the main result in Table 7 only the
average effect after the march.54 In the Appendix Table A.13, we show the full interaction
with decade dummies, which replicates more closely the rest of the paper.
In line with our hypothesis, we find that counties in Sherman’s path with a large share of
wealthy, large landowners experienced a lower decline in land prices following the destruction.
For agricultural investments, the effect is not statistically significant despite being of the right
sign and of similar magnitude. Furthermore, when looking at the effect by decades, it is clear
that this effect is not driven by any differential trend in this group of high-wealth counties
within Sherman, but this effect is the response of these counties to the economic shock.
thresholds of wealth, including top 5% or 1%. We construct these numbers using the IPUMS 1% sample of
the 1870 Census for white men in GA, NC, and SC.
54Since we are collapsing the time dimension to only pre vs. post, this model is estimated only using
1850–1880. The results are similar with the full sample, as the results by decade in Table A.13 suggest.
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These differences are also relatively large in magnitude, suggesting that this mechanism can
explain a large part of the variation in Sherman’s effects.
[Table 7 about here.]
Next, we explore the effects of the march on land concentration. If farmers are financially
constrained, a shock to capital—and the costs of rebuilding afterwards—should trigger a
redistribution of land from cash-strapped to cash-rich farmers, therefore increasing the overall
land concentration in the area. This increase in concentration is magnified if large landowners
are already less cash-constrained ex ante or if they have better access to external financing.
Importantly, this “fire sale” behavior (Shleifer and Vishny 1993) should not be relevant if
credit markets are well-functioning and rebuilding does not present large economy of scale.
This test builds on the ideas discussed in Rajan and Ramcharan (2011), which explores the
role of agriculture elites in early 20th century in restricting financial development as a way to
generate more economic rents. In their analysis, they highlight how the lack of formal credit
markets helps large landowners create a monopoly on financing, for instance, by allowing
them to “buy land cheaply when small farmers [are] hit by adversity” (Rajan and Ramcharan
2011). Though they disagree with some of the conclusions of that paper, the general notion
that large landowners are a source of financing for local farmers is confirmed by Jaremski
and Fishback (2016); in fact, Jaremski and Fishback (2016) study a time period in the US
that overlaps with out main analysis.
To examine this theory, we compare changes in land concentration around the Civil War
across march and non-march counties, as in equation 1. To measure land concentration, we
construct an index of land ownership inequality as in Nunn (2008). This index is a Gini
coefficient based on the distribution of land ownership by acreage.55 As we discuss later, a
limitation of this measure is that data on land ownership by acreage are only available since
55Farm size is categorized in seven bins. The farm size bins are 0 to 9, 10 to 19, 20 to 49, 50 to 99, 100 to
499, 500 to 999, and over 1,000 acres. We construct two Gini coefficients based on these data, one setting
each farm to the median of each bin and another setting each farm to the minimum of each bin. For the
largest bin size, we use 1000 in both cases.
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1860, and therefore this analysis is carried out over the period 1860-1920.
[Table 8 about here.]
We find that land inequality increases substantially after Sherman’s march in march
counties relative to non-march counties (Table 8). Like the agricultural differences, this dif-
ference persists through 1920. Compared with the 1860 difference in inequality across march
and non-march counties, the 1870–1920 differences were between 5% and 15% larger. This
confirms that land ownership experienced an economically significant increase in response to
the capital destruction caused by the war. This is consistent with the idea that credit-market
imperfections played an important role in postwar agricultural finance.
Though we do not have information on land ownership in 1850, we are able to construct a
different proxy for inequality in the prebellum period and show that there are no differential
pre-trends across Sherman and non-Sherman counties. We construct a slave-holding Gini
index, which should still capture variation in wealth that is related to land ownership activity,
from data collected in both 1850 and 1860. Consistent with this claim, the residualized (for
population, latitude and longitude, county size, and state fixed effects) correlation between
the two measures in 1860, the only year in which both exist, is 0.34, which suggests that the
latter is a reasonable proxy measure of the former in 1850.56 In the fifth and sixth columns of
Table 8, we show that the slave-holding measure indicates that inequality was not trending
differentially prior to the march across march and non-march counties. This effect is both
small in magnitude and statistically non-significant.
Overall, this section has provided evidence for the importance of a well-functioning finan-
cial sector in the recovery process. If financial markets are not perfect, the reconstruction
effort is also affected by financial constraints, therefore weakening the overall recovery. This
may increase the size of the effect of a shock in the short run and slow down the reversal
56The slave-holding Gini is constructed similarly using 21 bins counting the number of slaveholdings of
each certain size in terms of slaves. The slave-holding bins are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 19,
20 to 29, 30 to 39, 40 to 49, 50 to 69, 70 to 99, 100 to 199, 200 to 299, 300 to 499, 500 to 999, and over
1,000. In 1850, the slave-holding data are from a full-sample of the 1850 Slave Census that we constructed.
In 1860, we draw the slave-holding data from Haines (2010).
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in the long run. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that financial markets were not
highly developed in the South in the nineteenth century and deteriorated further after the
Civil War. Then, in order to confirm this hypothesis, we carried out three main tests. First,
we have shown that alternative leading explanations for a lack of recovery in the short and
long term—a demographic shift or lack of infrastructure—do not appear to be confirmed by
data. Second, we have provided direct evidence of the importance of credit for the recovery
in manufacturing. In particular, we have shown that growth in manufacturing was especially
affected by Sherman’s march in places where credit was more extensive prior to the Civil
War. Lastly, we have shown that the agricultural recovery was much weaker in counties
without access to credit from larger local landowners and that land ownership patterns in
the postbellum period are consistent with the presence of fire sales after the destruction of
the march. While none of these tests is perfect, combined these analyses provide convin-
cing evidence that credit-market imperfections are responsible for part of the weak relative
recovery from the march.
7 Conclusion
When General William Sherman began his march in Atlanta in August 1864, he sought to
“make old and young, rich and poor, feel the hard hand of war.” He and his men foraged for
300 miles through Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina and “enforce[d] devastation”
on the rebel states, “aveng[ing] the national wrong [Southerners had committed by] dragging
[the] country into civil war.”57
By the time Sherman received the surrender of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston
at Bennett Place in North Carolina in April 1865, the Union general and his soldiers had
wreaked significant economic damage on parts of the Confederacy. Nor did this damage end
at the conclusion of the war. Both agricultural and manufacturing outcomes fell significantly
in march counties relative to nearby, non-march counties in 1870. Moreover, agriculture
57Letter from Sherman to Halleck, December 24, 1864 in US War Department (1901).
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production and values remained persistently lower in counties destroyed by Sherman for
more than a half-century. We have argued that the lack of credit in the postwar American
South explains part of the strength of the effects in the short run and the persistence of the
agricultural effects in the long run.
Capital destruction caused by war or natural disaster is a frequent event in human history.
It is important to understand its consequences—in both the short and long run—and the
factors that affect the recovery. This paper has shown that the economic costs of large
property and infrastructure destruction can be substantial and persistent. Furthermore,
we have highlighted the importance of a developed financial sector to reduce such effects.
Examining whether these effects are confined to total war, infrastructure-focused campaigns
like Sherman’s or could be the consequence of more traditional military-centered battles is
an area for future research. Similarly, it may be that the non-economic long-term effect
of total war campaigns—on outcomes like political beliefs or trust—is large and persistent.
Lastly, future research can explore various policies that can be put in place to create a more
effective and efficient reconstruction.
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Table 1: Sherman Target County Characteristics in 1860
Counties Means
March Counties Non March Counties Difference
Demographics
Population (000s) 13.26 10.73 2.53∗∗
(7.68) (7.87) (1.20)
Slaves Population (000s) 7.18 4.27 2.91∗∗∗
(6.22) (4.68) (0.78)
Slave Percent 49.78 35.25 14.53∗∗∗
(15.22) (19.84) (2.88)
Free Black Percent 1.03 1.26 -0.23
(1.56) (1.92) (0.28)
Average Age 18.31 18.22 0.09
(0.78) (1.13) (0.16)
Percent of Population Urban 1.98 2.09 -0.11
(8.74) (9.51) (1.43)
Land Concentration (Gini Coefficient) 0.42 0.45 -0.03∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.01)
Agriculture
Farm Value ($ M) 2.58 1.68 0.90∗∗∗
(2.15) (1.41) (0.25)
Agricultural Output per sq mile 1517.89 1285.30 232.60∗
(736.37) (834.58) (124.48)
Percent Improved Farm Land 32.75 28.97 3.78∗
(14.95) (13.36) (2.12)
Cotton Suitability 733.16 606.05 127.12∗∗∗
(69.99) (171.58) (23.39)
Ginned Cotton (pounds) per sq mile 5996.99 3526.51 2470.48∗∗∗
(4101.13) (4950.60) (729.17)
Indian corn (bushels) per sq mile 603.92 662.27 -58.35
(251.98) (377.85) (53.77)
Wheat (bushels) per sq mile 50.71 88.20 -37.48∗∗∗
(47.34) (100.17) (13.78)
Sweet potatoes (bushels) per sq mile 150.32 116.71 33.60∗∗∗
(72.56) (79.97) (12.00)
Horses per sq mile 2.87 2.99 -0.12
(1.03) (1.62) (0.23)
Mules per sq mile 2.15 1.68 0.48∗∗
(1.34) (1.32) (0.20)
Oxen per sq mile 1.28 1.31 -0.02
(0.93) (0.86) (0.13)
Pigs per sq mile 41.00 38.21 2.79
(13.50) (16.37) (2.41)
Manufacturing
Manufacturing Value Added (000s) 66.96 68.51 -1.54
(98.49) (110.83) (16.55)
Manufacturing Establishments 36.81 26.40 10.40
(74.86) (38.22) (7.69)
Total Employment in Manufacturing 135.84 135.63 0.21
(204.57) (184.78) (29.17)
Infrastructure
County close to canal or river 0.70 0.58 0.12
(0.46) (0.49) (0.07)
Railways Miles per 100 Square Mile 3.06 1.76 1.30∗∗∗
(3.17) (2.54) (0.42)
Observations 57 166 223
Notes: Agricultural data from the US Census of Agriculture, 1860. Manufacturing data from the US Census of Manufactures, 1860. Demo-
graphic data are from the US Census of Population, 1860. Slave percent and free black percent as measured per capita, where the population
includes all free and enslaved people. All agricultural output and livestock data are measured per square mile in each county.
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Table 2: Differences in Agricultural Outcomes Relative to 1860 Difference,
by Sherman March Exposure, 1850-1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Value of Farms Log Value of Livestock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x 1850 0.062 0.051 0.014 −0.011 0.030 0.014
(0.045) (0.049) (0.057) (0.056) (0.034) (0.037)
Sherman x 1870 −0.153∗∗ −0.123∗∗ −0.213∗∗∗ −0.209∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.059) (0.076) (0.074) (0.050) (0.054)
Sherman x 1880 −0.139∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗ −0.060 −0.013 −0.041 −0.009
(0.046) (0.040) (0.056) (0.044) (0.036) (0.028)
Sherman x 1890 −0.167∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗ −0.108 −0.075 −0.112∗∗ −0.074∗
(0.048) (0.040) (0.069) (0.060) (0.045) (0.041)
Sherman x 1900 −0.196∗∗∗ −0.143∗∗∗ −0.142∗ −0.106 −0.151∗∗∗ −0.097∗∗
(0.066) (0.048) (0.077) (0.065) (0.055) (0.042)
Sherman x 1910 −0.200∗∗∗ −0.157∗∗∗ −0.085 −0.075 −0.070 −0.045
(0.075) (0.054) (0.101) (0.081) (0.064) (0.051)
Sherman x 1920 −0.200∗∗ −0.151∗∗ −0.049 −0.032 −0.056 −0.019
(0.088) (0.061) (0.108) (0.087) (0.072) (0.055)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1779 1779 1779 1779 1779 1779
Clusters 223 223 223 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.345 0.018 0.032 0.024 0.042
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an
indicator equal to one if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with the dis-
played decade indicators, plus the noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include
land area in square miles, population, value of farmland, average number of slaves per farm, share of
plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march
and all decades, 1850-1920. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3: Differences in Manufacturing Outcomes Relative to 1860 Difference, by Sherman
March Exposure, 1850-1880
Log Employment Log Capital Log Establishments Log Value of Production
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman x 1850 0.123 0.028 0.097 −0.042 0.000 0.000 0.188 0.107
(0.174) (0.172) (0.196) (0.196) (.) (.) (0.214) (0.209)
Sherman x 1870 −0.228 −0.190 −0.340∗∗ −0.341∗∗ −0.117 −0.041 −0.216 −0.178
(0.141) (0.156) (0.146) (0.155) (0.174) (0.186) (0.170) (0.175)
Sherman x 1880 −0.031 0.001 −0.235 −0.190 −0.064 0.036 −0.151 −0.070
(0.179) (0.188) (0.160) (0.167) (0.171) (0.179) (0.180) (0.178)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 838 838 837 837 635 635 837 837
Clusters 222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.001 0.012 0.012 0.032 0.030 0.000 0.010
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to one
if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with the displayed decade indicators, plus the noted fixed
effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farmland, average
slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march
and all decades, 1850-1880. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes, by Sherman March Exposure, 1860-1880
Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1870
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.853∗∗∗ -0.943∗∗ -0.466∗∗ -0.492∗∗ -1.035∗∗∗ -1.233∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.313) (0.404) (0.199) (0.229) (0.385) (0.529) (0.139) (0.160)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.033 0.005 0.044 0.004 0.044 0.007 0.038
Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1880
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.079 0.192 0.401 0.724∗∗ 0.101 0.393 -0.002 0.190
(0.323) (0.291) (0.374) (0.314) (0.527) (0.512) (0.172) (0.147)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.045 0.033 0.055 0.015 0.032 0.089 0.113
Each column is a separate county-industry level regression of the percentage change between 1860 and 1870 in the column
indicated manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to one if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march plus
the noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farm-
land, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all reported industries in all
counties within 100 miles of the march. The sample is unbalanced because not all industries are present in all counties.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 5: Demographic and Infrastructure Outcomes, by Sherman March Exposure, 1850-
1920
Population Black Share Log Railroad Miles Log Railroad Miles + 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman x 1850 0.047 0.033 0.046 0.041 0.320 0.501 0.005∗ 0.007∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.046) (0.049) (0.242) (0.310) (0.003) (0.003)
Sherman x 1870 -0.026 -0.032 -0.006 -0.026 0.025 0.010 -0.001 0.000
(0.019) (0.020) (0.032) (0.034) (0.178) (0.158) (0.002) (0.002)
Sherman x 1880 0.015 0.014 0.049 0.037 -0.004 0.012 0.000 0.003
(0.023) (0.022) (0.040) (0.041) (0.196) (0.180) (0.004) (0.004)
Sherman x 1890 -0.059 -0.056 -0.050 -0.078 -0.082 -0.068 -0.004 0.000
(0.041) (0.041) (0.061) (0.060) (0.220) (0.212) (0.005) (0.005)
Sherman x 1900 -0.072 -0.061 -0.027 -0.060 0.049 -0.014 0.006 0.008
(0.055) (0.050) (0.076) (0.071) (0.232) (0.227) (0.006) (0.006)
Sherman x 1910 -0.076 -0.060 0.020 -0.033 0.027 -0.037 0.006 0.007
(0.066) (0.061) (0.089) (0.081) (0.239) (0.233) (0.007) (0.008)
Sherman x 1920 -0.050 -0.029 0.089 0.025 0.041 -0.036 0.009 0.009
(0.074) (0.068) (0.099) (0.088) (0.240) (0.233) (0.008) (0.008)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1779 1779 1777 1777 1319 1319 1779 1779
Clusters 223 223 223 223 218 218 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.013 0.001 0.009 0.031 0.129 0.076 0.222 0.242
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated demographic or infrastructure outcome on an indica-
tor equal to one if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march interacted with decadal indicators plus the noted fixed
effects and controls. In general, the 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farmland,
average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. When the outcome is population, we drop popula-
tion as a control. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1870, by Sherman March Expo-
sure and Finance Access
Bank Status
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman 0.131 -0.049 0.157 0.102 0.151 -0.176 -0.072 -0.113
(0.350) (0.431) (0.223) (0.263) (0.377) (0.566) (0.088) (0.123)
Bank County 1.731∗∗∗ 1.360∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗ 1.857∗∗ 1.354 0.870∗∗∗ 0.679∗∗∗
(0.613) (0.595) (0.326) (0.308) (0.889) (0.859) (0.243) (0.230)
Sherman x Bank -1.752∗∗∗ -1.685∗∗ -1.106∗∗∗ -1.096∗∗∗ -2.106∗∗∗ -1.968∗∗ -0.679∗∗∗ -0.674∗∗∗
(0.588) (0.662) (0.350) (0.392) (0.732) (0.785) (0.238) (0.249)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.040 0.018 0.050 0.015 0.049 0.026 0.047
Dun, Boyd, and Company Status
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.479∗ -0.833∗∗ -0.273∗ -0.463∗∗ -0.445 -0.999∗∗ -0.291∗∗ -0.436∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.346) (0.164) (0.204) (0.300) (0.412) (0.112) (0.134)
Any DB firms 5.152∗∗ 4.742∗∗ 3.132∗∗∗ 2.739∗∗∗ 6.979∗∗ 6.600∗ 2.604∗∗∗ 2.470∗∗∗
(2.241) (2.271) (1.061) (1.050) (3.479) (3.536) (0.793) (0.815)
Sherman x Any DB firms -3.743 -3.076 -1.919∗ -1.475 -5.933∗ -5.004 -1.604∗ -1.344∗
(2.297) (2.033) (1.109) (0.989) (3.503) (3.061) (0.820) (0.756)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.067 0.066 0.081 0.070 0.091 0.081 0.090
Each column is a separate county-industry-year level regression of the change from 1860 to 1870 in the indicated manufactu-
ring outcome on the displayed interaction terms, fixed effects, and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in
square miles, population, value of farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. DB
firms refers to the number of Dun, Boyd, and Company-tracked firms in the county as of 1860. The sample is all counties
within 100 miles of the march. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 7: Agricultural Outcomes, by Land Wealth and Sherman March Exposure, 1850-1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Farm Value Log Livestock Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x Post -0.193∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.063) (0.061) (0.043) (0.045)
High Land Wealth
x Post x Sherman 0.167 0.058 0.355∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.097
(0.120) (0.109) (0.104) (0.086) (0.085) (0.081)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
High Wealth X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 891 891 891 891 891 891
Clusters 223 223 223 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.074 0.120 0.082 0.136 0.105
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if
the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with an indicators for post 1860 decades and a dummy for
High Land Wealth, plus the noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles,
population, value of farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all
counties within 100 miles of the march and all decades, 1850-1880, as discussed in the paper. The dummy for High Land
Wealth is equal to one for those counties that are in the top quarter in terms of share of farms that are more than 1000
acres. The Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Wealth Concentration by Sherman March Exposure, 1850-1920
Farm Size Gini Slave Holding Gini
Median Bin Minimum Bin Median Bin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x 1850 -0.007 -0.001
(0.008) (0.009)
Sherman x 1870 0.060∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.029)
Sherman x 1880 0.144∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.023) (0.046) (0.029)
Sherman x 1890 0.130∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.023) (0.044) (0.028)
Sherman x 1900 0.076∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.020) (0.035) (0.024)
Sherman x 1910 0.071∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.033) (0.023)
Sherman x 1920 0.068∗∗∗ 0.033∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.019) (0.034) (0.023)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1557 1557 1557 1557 408 408
Clusters 223 223 223 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.56 0.14 0.52 0.01 0.01
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated inequality measure on an indicator equal to one if
the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march interacted with decadal indicators, plus the noted fixed effects and con-
trols. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march. The gini measure in columns 1 to 4 is constructed following
Nunn (2008) and uses farm size data from the Census of Agriculture, 1850-1920. The gini measure in columns 5 and 6 is
constructed using the same procedure, except using slaveholdings rather than farm size. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
53
Figure 1: Sherman’s March, War Department Map
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Treated − Within 5mi of March
Control − Between 5mi and 100mi from March
Cities − Excluded from sample
Figure 2: Sherman’s March and 1860 County Boundaries. Based on the War Department
Map in Figure 1. The vertex cities on the march are excluded from our analysis: Atlanta
(captured September 2, 1864), Savannah, GA (December 10, 1864), Columbia, SC (February
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Figure 3: Difference in Log Improved Acre Share and Value of Farms, by Sherman March
Exposure, 1850-1920
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Treated − Within 15mi of Placebo March
Control − Between 15mi and 100mi from Placebo March




















Figure 5: Estimated effects of 341 placebo march paths between triples of Southern cities on
log improved acre share, 1850–1920. The effects of Sherman’s march are presented in blue
with diamonds at each decadal estimate.
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(a) Sherman’s effect across alternative treatment definitions
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(b) Sherman’s effect across alternative control definitions
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Number of Banks in Sherman
and non-Sherman March Counties
Figure 7: The number of banks in Sherman’s march and non-march counties was comparable




(a) Counties with banks in 1859 in Georgia,
South Carolina, and North Carolina
DB Rated Firm in County
(b) Counties with Dun, Boyd, & Company rated
firms in 1860 in Georgia, South Carolina, and
North Carolina
Figure A.1
Table A.1: Link Rate from Marriages to 1870 Census (%)
March Counties Non March Counties Difference
Georgia 37.80 39.10 -1.30
(2.28)
North Carolina 38.91 38.66 0.26
(8.99)
Total 37.92 39.13 -1.21
(2.28)
Notes: Lists of the names of grooms in Georgia and North Carolina
were collected from state marriage records between 1868 and 1872.
The grooms were then matched by first and last name to the com-
plete 1870 census schedule. The link rate reports the share of grooms
successfully matched using a variant of the automated linking proce-
dure described in Feigenbaum (2016). Match rates are comparable
to other linking projects using census data in this era. The Georgia





Table A.2: Differences in 1850-1860 Changes in County Outcomes, by Sherman March Ex-
posure
Differences in 1850-1860 Changes in County Agricultural Outcomes
Means
March Counties Non-March Counties Difference
Population 0.10 0.16 -0.06
(0.04)
Farm Value 0.53 0.60 -0.07
(0.07)
Livestock Value 0.43 0.48 -0.05
(0.04)
Farmland Value 0.72 0.70 0.03
(0.08)
Share of Improved Acres -0.91 -1.06 0.15
(0.11)
Black Share 0.02 0.02 0.00
(0.03)
Agricultural Output 0.23 0.31 -0.09
(0.06)
Wheat 0.47 0.59 -0.12
(0.14)
Rye 0.80 0.87 -0.07
(0.19)
Indian Corn 0.03 0.09 -0.06
(0.06)
Oats -0.90 -0.82 -0.09
(0.15)
Ginned Cotton 0.38 0.56 -0.18
(0.21)
Wool -0.23 -0.14 -0.09
(0.09)
Peas and Bean 0.48 0.57 -0.09
(0.16)
Sweet Potato -0.06 0.03 -0.09
(0.06)
Butter 0.13 0.08 0.05
(0.07)
Horses -0.15 -0.05 -0.09
(0.04)
Mules 0.50 0.76 -0.26
(0.07)
Oxen 0.07 0.21 -0.14
(0.07)
Pigs -0.03 -0.04 0.01
(0.04)
Differences in 1850-1860 Changes in County Manufacturing Outcomes
Means
March Counties Non-March Counties Difference
Value Production 0.63 0.88 -0.25
(0.20)
Employment 0.16 0.29 -0.13
(0.18)
Notes: Each column reflects the average 1850 to 1860 difference in logs of the indicated outcome across counties in the indicated group. Data
are from the US Census of Agriculture, 1850 and 1860. Data on establishments and capital were not available in 1850. Data are from the US
Census of Manufactures, 1850 and 1860.
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Table A.3: Change in Lumber Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1870, by Sherman
March Exposure
Lumber Industry
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.958 -0.926 -0.521 -0.533 -0.502∗ -0.599∗ -0.493∗ -0.479∗
(0.910) (0.950) (0.402) (0.453) (0.285) (0.318) (0.263) (0.272)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Clusters 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180
Adjusted R2 0.022 0.116 0.017 0.068 0.018 0.089 0.018 0.030
Each column is a separate county level regression of the percentage change between 1860 and 1870 in the column indicated
lumber manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to one if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march plus the
noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farmland,
average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all lumber industries in counties
within 100 miles of the march. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.4: IV: Agricultural Outcomes, by Sherman March Exposure, 1850-1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Value of Farms Log Value of Livestock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x 1850 -0.006 0.004 -0.077 -0.050 -0.031 -0.030
(0.055) (0.063) (0.069) (0.074) (0.043) (0.046)
Sherman x 1870 -0.156∗∗ -0.150∗∗ -0.214∗∗ -0.175∗ -0.143∗∗ -0.157∗∗
(0.074) (0.070) (0.097) (0.093) (0.064) (0.068)
Sherman x 1880 -0.108∗ -0.088∗ -0.057 0.009 0.008 0.020
(0.058) (0.053) (0.072) (0.058) (0.046) (0.038)
Sherman x 1890 -0.155∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.088 -0.048 -0.091 -0.074
(0.059) (0.052) (0.093) (0.080) (0.055) (0.052)
Sherman x 1900 -0.135 -0.133∗∗ -0.098 -0.071 -0.085 -0.065
(0.083) (0.061) (0.102) (0.085) (0.067) (0.053)
Sherman x 1910 -0.132 -0.153∗∗ -0.001 -0.007 0.003 -0.004
(0.096) (0.066) (0.135) (0.105) (0.081) (0.064)
Sherman x 1920 -0.112 -0.141∗ 0.097 0.096 0.059 0.056
(0.113) (0.076) (0.142) (0.120) (0.092) (0.074)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1779 1779 1779 1779 1779 1779
Clusters 223 223 223 223 223 223
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if the
county is within five miles of Sherman’s march interacted with decadal indicators, plus the noted fixed effects and controls,
where the Sherman’s march indicator is instrumented with an indicator for within 15 miles of a straight-line path between
the four march vertices: Atlanta, GA, Savannah, GA, Columbia, SC, and Goldsboro, NC. The 1860 county controls include
land area in square miles, population, value of farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton
production. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.5: IV: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1870, by Sherman March
Exposure
Growth, 1860-1870
Establishments Capital Employment Value Added
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.979∗∗∗ -1.215∗∗ -0.495∗∗ -0.580∗ -1.017∗∗ -1.388∗∗ -0.481∗∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.531) (0.241) (0.301) (0.431) (0.684) (0.153) (0.194)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Each column is a separate county-industry level regression of the indicated manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to
one if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march plus the noted fixed effects, where the Sherman’s march indicator
is instrumented with an indicator for within 15 miles of a straight-line path between four march vertices: Atlanta, GA,
Savannah, GA, Columbia, SC, and Goldsboro, NC. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.6: Agricultural Outcomes, by Placebo March Exposure, 1850-1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Value of Farms Log Value of Livestock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo x 1850 0.004 −0.057 0.088 −0.011 0.005 −0.030
(0.062) (0.069) (0.067) (0.061) (0.054) (0.053)
Placebo x 1870 −0.145 −0.135 0.042 0.012 −0.139 −0.131
(0.103) (0.090) (0.101) (0.099) (0.085) (0.102)
Placebo x 1880 −0.016 0.005 0.127∗ 0.092∗ 0.035 0.062
(0.061) (0.051) (0.070) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043)
Placebo x 1890 −0.021 0.004 0.058 0.028 0.025 0.051
(0.061) (0.050) (0.084) (0.065) (0.061) (0.059)
Placebo x 1900 −0.081 −0.049 0.067 0.047 0.000 0.027
(0.080) (0.059) (0.094) (0.076) (0.067) (0.058)
Placebo x 1910 −0.064 −0.024 0.215∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.092 0.107
(0.081) (0.056) (0.123) (0.094) (0.078) (0.067)
Placebo x 1920 −0.062 −0.010 0.300∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.146∗ 0.170∗∗
(0.086) (0.062) (0.138) (0.107) (0.084) (0.068)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Treatment Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075 1075
Clusters 135 135 135 135 135 135
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.461 0.021 0.028 0.008 0.019
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if the
county is within fifteen miles of the placebo Sherman march, interacted with the displayed decade indicators, plus the noted
fixed effects, the usual controls and the treatment variables. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles,
population, value of farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all
counties within 100 miles of the placebo march and all decades, 1850-1920. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table A.7: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1870, by Placebo
March Exposure
Growth Rates
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Placebo -0.260 -0.111 -0.222 -0.378 -1.354 -1.981 -0.038 -0.109
(1.662) (1.921) (1.147) (1.290) (1.497) (1.443) (0.514) (0.593)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Treatment Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 223 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
Clusters 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.042 0.078 0.082 0.083 0.083 0.117 0.103
Each column is a separate county-industry level regression of the percentage change between 1860 and 1870 in
the column indicated manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to one if the county is within fifteen miles
of the placebo Sherman march plus the noted fixed effects, the usual controls and the treatment variables. The
1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farmland, average slave per farm,
share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all reported industries in all counties within
100 miles of the placebo march. The sample is unbalanced because not all industries are present in all counties.
Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table A.8: Other Agricultural Outcomes, by Sherman March Exposure, 1850-1880
Agricultural Products
Cotton Corn Wheat Sweet Potato Rice Butter Oats Hay Tobacco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sherman x 1850 0.136 0.041 -0.134 0.058 0.785∗ -0.096 0.056 -0.720 0.372
(0.137) (0.060) (0.128) (0.059) (0.425) (0.081) (0.125) (0.723) (0.404)
Sherman x 1870 0.029 -0.100∗∗∗ 0.027 -0.080 1.564 -0.293∗∗ -0.118 -0.886 0.415
(0.129) (0.037) (0.127) (0.108) (1.004) (0.141) (0.174) (0.754) (0.502)
Sherman x 1880 0.124 0.125∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.008 -0.372 -0.128∗ -0.020 -0.276 0.117
(0.148) (0.032) (0.111) (0.072) (0.607) (0.075) (0.162) (0.669) (0.482)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 847 891 843 891 576 886 888 644 663
Clusters 221 223 221 223 209 223 223 214 216
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.505 0.075 0.405 0.170 0.000 0.189 0.237 0.367
Livestock
Horses Mules Oxen Pigs Sheep Cows Other Cattle
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sherman x 1850 0.045 0.215∗∗∗ 0.087 -0.006 0.144∗∗ 0.005 0.074
(0.033) (0.059) (0.070) (0.042) (0.066) (0.038) (0.061)
Sherman x 1870 -0.110∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗ 0.049 -0.132∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -0.077∗ -0.114∗∗
(0.035) (0.041) (0.093) (0.052) (0.062) (0.040) (0.050)
Sherman x 1880 -0.069∗∗ 0.018 -0.058 0.031 -0.310∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.031) (0.043) (0.097) (0.035) (0.068) (0.034) (0.033)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 891 891 891 891 891 891 891
Clusters 223 223 223 223 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.420 0.028 0.048 0.445 0.073 0.052 0.248
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if
the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with the displayed decade indicators, plus the noted fixed
effects and controls. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march and all decades, 1850-1880. Standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.9: Robustness, 10 mile treatment: Agricultural Outcomes, by Sherman March
Exposure, 1850-1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Value of Farms Log Value of Livestock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x 1850 0.038 0.026 0.017 −0.016 0.003 −0.014
(0.046) (0.047) (0.058) (0.054) (0.034) (0.034)
Sherman x 1870 −0.081 −0.047 −0.170∗∗ −0.181∗∗ −0.139∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗
(0.062) (0.062) (0.073) (0.072) (0.050) (0.055)
Sherman x 1880 −0.125∗∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.064 −0.012 −0.047 −0.002
(0.047) (0.040) (0.057) (0.044) (0.038) (0.031)
Sherman x 1890 −0.153∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗ −0.117∗ −0.075 −0.115∗∗ −0.070∗
(0.050) (0.041) (0.070) (0.056) (0.046) (0.040)
Sherman x 1900 −0.187∗∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.165∗∗ −0.108∗ −0.161∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗
(0.066) (0.048) (0.079) (0.061) (0.055) (0.042)
Sherman x 1910 −0.202∗∗∗ −0.136∗∗ −0.119 −0.069 −0.096 −0.052
(0.077) (0.055) (0.103) (0.078) (0.063) (0.050)
Sherman x 1920 −0.201∗∗ −0.122∗ −0.076 −0.013 −0.076 −0.017
(0.089) (0.062) (0.111) (0.088) (0.072) (0.056)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531
Clusters 192 192 192 192 192 192
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.315 0.015 0.034 0.018 0.036
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if
the county is within ten miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with the displayed decade indicators, plus the noted fixed
effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farmland, average
slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march
and all decades, 1850-1920. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.10: Robustness, 75 mile Bandwidth: Agricultural Outcomes, by Sherman March
Exposure, 1850-1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Value of Farms Log Value of Livestock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x 1850 0.033 0.020 −0.008 −0.035 0.013 −0.007
(0.044) (0.047) (0.057) (0.056) (0.034) (0.033)
Sherman x 1870 −0.120∗ −0.092 −0.198∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗ −0.129∗∗ −0.138∗∗
(0.064) (0.060) (0.076) (0.074) (0.052) (0.055)
Sherman x 1880 −0.116∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.081 −0.032 −0.036 −0.013
(0.047) (0.041) (0.057) (0.044) (0.037) (0.029)
Sherman x 1890 −0.143∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗ −0.109 −0.082 −0.093∗∗ −0.067
(0.049) (0.042) (0.071) (0.061) (0.046) (0.042)
Sherman x 1900 −0.162∗∗ −0.119∗∗ −0.137∗ −0.109∗ −0.130∗∗ −0.090∗∗
(0.067) (0.048) (0.080) (0.066) (0.056) (0.043)
Sherman x 1910 −0.169∗∗ −0.136∗∗ −0.085 −0.080 −0.064 −0.049
(0.077) (0.056) (0.104) (0.083) (0.064) (0.052)
Sherman x 1920 −0.166∗ −0.133∗∗ −0.061 −0.051 −0.048 −0.024
(0.089) (0.062) (0.110) (0.090) (0.071) (0.055)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531
Clusters 192 192 192 192 192 192
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.316 0.016 0.033 0.019 0.036
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if
the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with the displayed decade indicators, plus the noted fixed
effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of farmland, average
slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all counties within 75 miles of the march
and all decades, 1850-1920. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.11: Robustness, 75 mile bandwidth: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from
1860 to 1870, by Sherman March Exposure
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.930∗∗∗ -0.980∗∗ -0.515∗∗ -0.484∗ -1.106∗∗ -1.201∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗
(0.352) (0.472) (0.217) (0.257) (0.440) (0.609) (0.155) (0.180)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210 1210
Clusters 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.033 0.004 0.045 0.006 0.045 0.007 0.035
Each column is a separate county-industry level regression of the percentage change between 1860 and 1870 in the column
indicated manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to one if the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march plus
the noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of
farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all reported indus-
tries in all counties within 75 miles of the march. The sample is unbalanced because not all industries are present in all
counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Table A.12: Robustness, 10 mile treatment: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from
1860 to 1870, by Sherman March Exposure
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.772∗∗ -1.002∗∗ -0.298 -0.436∗ -0.880∗ -1.245∗∗ -0.340∗∗ -0.446∗∗
(0.342) (0.414) (0.232) (0.259) (0.452) (0.582) (0.161) (0.182)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.034 0.003 0.044 0.003 0.045 0.005 0.038
Each column is a separate county-industry level regression of the percentage change between 1860 and 1870 in the co-
lumn indicated manufacturing outcome on an indicator equal to one if the county is within ten miles of Sherman’s
march plus the noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, popula-
tion, value of farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all
reported industries in all counties within 100 miles of the march. The sample is unbalanced because not all industries
are present in all counties. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.13: Agricultural Outcomes, by Land Wealth and Sherman March Exposure, 1850-
1920
Log Improved Acre Share Log Farm Value Log Livestock Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sherman x 1850 0.056 0.024 0.013 -0.034 0.005 -0.015
(0.054) (0.055) (0.067) (0.065) (0.042) (0.042)
Sherman x 1870 -0.155∗∗∗ -0.144∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.352∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗ -0.208∗∗
(0.051) (0.054) (0.100) (0.093) (0.077) (0.085)
Sherman x 1880 -0.161∗∗∗ -0.136∗∗∗ -0.068 -0.053 -0.052 -0.039
(0.042) (0.042) (0.062) (0.054) (0.038) (0.033)
Sherman x 1890 -0.193∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗ -0.156∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.046) (0.083) (0.076) (0.055) (0.051)
Sherman x 1900 -0.199∗∗∗ -0.179∗∗∗ -0.175∗ -0.170∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.056) (0.090) (0.082) (0.060) (0.053)
Sherman x 1910 -0.224∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.097 -0.116 -0.077 -0.078
(0.078) (0.062) (0.113) (0.098) (0.072) (0.062)
Sherman x 1920 -0.190∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.036 -0.050 -0.041 -0.037
(0.097) (0.072) (0.119) (0.104) (0.078) (0.067)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1850 0.040 0.092 -0.017 0.079 0.066 0.090
(0.100) (0.096) (0.120) (0.097) (0.077) (0.073)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1870 0.134 0.073 0.456∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.225∗ 0.175
(0.157) (0.155) (0.136) (0.123) (0.126) (0.136)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1880 0.224∗∗ 0.122 0.218∗∗ 0.129 0.149∗∗ 0.094
(0.098) (0.091) (0.108) (0.079) (0.075) (0.059)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1890 0.262∗∗∗ 0.141∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.083) (0.135) (0.098) (0.088) (0.074)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1900 0.263∗∗ 0.117 0.377∗∗∗ 0.198∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.167∗∗
(0.123) (0.097) (0.138) (0.108) (0.105) (0.079)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1910 0.354∗∗ 0.162 0.370∗∗ 0.133 0.200∗ 0.106
(0.140) (0.105) (0.182) (0.142) (0.120) (0.095)
Sherman x High Land Wealth
x 1920 0.285∗ 0.084 0.299 0.061 0.162 0.060
(0.152) (0.112) (0.194) (0.159) (0.133) (0.106)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
High Wealth X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State X Year
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County
Controls X Year No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1779 1779 1779 1779 1779 1779
Clusters 223 223 223 223 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.038 0.399 0.055 0.156 0.049 0.133
Each column is a separate county-year level regression of the indicated agricultural outcome on an indicator equal to one if
the county is within five miles of Sherman’s march, interacted with decades dummy and a dummy for High Land Wealth,
plus the noted fixed effects and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area in square miles, population, value of
farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production. The sample is all counties within 100
miles of the march and all decades, 1850-1920, as discussed in the paper. The dummy for High Land Wealth is equal to
one for those counties that are in the top quarter in terms of share of farms that are more than 1000 acres. The standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table A.14: Change in Manufacturing Outcomes from 1860 to 1870, by Sherman March
Exposure and Financial Access
Value Added Employment Capital Establishments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sherman -0.112 -0.296 0.005 -0.074 -0.087 -0.426 -0.110 -0.156
(0.318) (0.375) (0.184) (0.226) (0.341) (0.457) (0.081) (0.114)
High Bank Drop 2.751∗∗ 1.995∗ 1.769∗∗∗ 1.211∗∗ 3.508∗∗ 2.536∗ 1.606∗∗∗ 1.353∗∗∗
(1.112) (1.033) (0.574) (0.530) (1.694) (1.531) (0.438) (0.435)
Sherman x High Bank Drop -2.978∗∗∗ -2.567∗∗ -1.898∗∗∗ -1.630∗∗∗ -3.808∗∗ -3.220∗∗ -1.480∗∗∗ -1.366∗∗∗
(1.143) (1.078) (0.600) (0.561) (1.718) (1.510) (0.455) (0.440)
Industry Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1860 County Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394 1394
Clusters 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Adjusted R2 0.029 0.044 0.040 0.057 0.036 0.056 0.059 0.064
Each column is a separate county-industry-year level regression of the change from 1860 to 1870 in the indicated manufac-
turing outcome on the displayed interaction terms, fixed effects, and controls. The 1860 county controls include land area
in square miles, population, value of farmland, average slave per farm, share of plantation farms, and cotton production.
High Bank Drop is a dummy which is equal to one for counties in the bottom half in terms of bank growth over 1859-1870.
The sample is all counties within 100 miles of the march. Standard errors are clustered at the county level.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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